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Abstract 
This article is the first of two that grapple with a central policy challenge facing the 
administrative state:  how to govern in times of dynamic change, when challenges, and 
opportunities to address them, are both shifting rapidly.  The article suggests that, conceptually, 
process design that is likely to produce effective regulatory governance requires attention to 
three key distinct but interrelated variables – the actors who are or should be involved in 
program implementation in different capacities, the mechanisms (legal and otherwise) available 
to promote good governance, and the tools available to advance desired results.  To demonstrate 
the value of the conceptual framework that we introduce here, the article uses it to assess one 
agency’s ongoing experiment in transforming its approach to regulatory enforcement, the 
federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  It explores the reasons for EPA’s judgment 
that a dramatically altered regulatory landscape requires the agency to transform its 
enforcement strategies.  It then analyzes what EPA has characterized as its new enforcement and 
compliance paradigm, which the agency calls Next Generation Compliance.  The article 
demonstrates how use of our conceptual framework to systematically consider the roles of the 
relevant actors, mechanisms, and tools, individually and in combination with one another, helps 
to identify beneficial regulatory options that alternative frameworks like the one EPA has used in 
designing the Next Generation Compliance initiative may overlook.  The companion article 
builds on this foundation by further documenting how our framework will help to promote more 
systematic regulatory design in situations in which policy makers believe that a transformation 
or a new paradigm is needed, such as the situation EPA faces in enforcing the environmental 
laws.  Our analysis underscores the value of our three-pronged conceptual framework in areas 
that extend well beyond environmental regulation.   
I.  Introduction 
“Change is constant in nature and society.”1  In particular, “institutional change is 
constant and inevitable.”2  Indeed, some have characterized the constancy and inevitability of 
change as “the organizing principle of democracy.”3  The unceasing nature of change poses 
challenges to governance regimes, including government regulatory programs.  In some 
instances, the policymakers who created these programs built into them processes and standards 
for responding to changes in the scope or nature of the problems these programs are designed to 
address.  In other instances, policymakers have not foreseen change, or at least have not foreseen 
the particular shifts in circumstances that confront government officials responsible for 
1 Moonhawk River Stone, Approaching Critical Mass: An Exploration of the Role of Intersex Allies in Creating 
Positive Education, Advocacy and Change, 12 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 353, 358 (2005); see also Steven Johnston 
Knopp, More Change, and New Directions, W. VA. LAW., March/April 2008, at 4 (“If there is one unchanging truth 
in the universe, it is that change is constant.”); Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the 
Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 YALE L.J. 1321, 1383 (1989) (citing 1 SELECTED WORKS OF MAO TSE TUNG 341-42 
(1967) (stability is ephemeral, change is constant).  This insight is not new.  See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE 
SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE FOURTH, act 3, sc. 1, lines 51–53 (“[H]ow chances mock/And changes fill the 
cup of alteration/With divers liquors!”). 
2 Michael Halberstam, The Myth of “Conquered Provinces”: Probing the Extent of the VRA’s Encroachment on 
State and Local Autonomy, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 923, 947-48 (2011). 
3 Steven G. Gey, Is Moral Relativism A Constitutional Command?, 70 IND. L.J. 331, 368 (1995). 
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implementing the programs.4  In such instances, the risk that change will frustrate policymakers’ 
goals is likely to increase, especially if it is abrupt or unprecedented.    
 
This article grapples with this central and recurring policy challenge:  how to structure 
and administer regulatory programs in times of dynamic change, when challenges, and 
opportunities to address them, are both shifting rapidly.  We believe it is incontrovertible that 
regulatory design has the potential to facilitate or thwart policymakers’ efforts to implement 
regulatory programs in the face of change in a manner consistent with programmatic goals 
identified by legislators.5  We further believe that the recent scholarly attention to the 
adaptability of legal regimes, and the use of ex ante vs. ex post decision making approaches, 
offers considerable insight concerning the issues policy makers and others need to consider in 
dynamic times.6    
 
Our purpose in this article is to suggest a three-part conceptual framework (depicted in 
Figure 1 below) to assist policymakers seeking to design regulatory structures likely to produce 
effective governance in dynamic circumstances.  The framework identifies as key regulatory 
design considerations the roles of each of the actors who are or should be involved in different 
capacities in administering the governance regime, the mechanisms (legal and otherwise) 
available to promote regulatory goals, and the tools available to policymakers and other 
stakeholders to advance desired results.  Policymakers should be cognizant of the manner in 
which options for addressing each of these three variables are likely to affect the desired 
functioning of the other two.  Thus, for example, a legal mechanism for advancing regulatory 
goals, such as the use of enforcement actions to induce compliance with regulatory standards, 
may work better if it is controlled by one actor or a combination of actors.  Similarly, the 
availability of new regulatory tools may suggest the need for, or opportunities presented by, a 
shift in the roles played by the actors involved in implementing or affected by the program.7  A 
variety of literatures grapple with aspects of our framework, including “new governance” theory 
and various formulations of federalism theory (all of which focus on actors); literatures that 
4 There may be considerable uncertainty about the adaptability of a legal regime to address new challenges.  See, 
e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding that Congress intended to create an adaptable framework 
for responding to air pollution threats in the face of competing perspectives offered by different EPA General 
Counsels). 
5 In Massachusetts v. EPA, for example, the Court concluded that Congress intended to delegate to EPA the 
authority to address particular forms of air pollution whose potential adverse impacts Congress was unaware of 
when it adopted the Clean Air Act.  The case illustrates the capacity of a regulatory design crafted to accommodate 
change to give regulators the authority to forge ahead in new directions that were unanticipated at the time of 
program formation but that advance statutory goals. 
6 There is an emerging literature on the appropriateness of adaptive management and on the use of ex ante vs. ex 
post decision making processes.  See, e.g., Robin Kundis Craig & J.B. Ruhl, Designing Administrative Law for 
Adaptive Management, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2014).  See also J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for Resilience 
and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems – with Applications to Climate Change Adaptation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 
1374, 1375, 1376 (2011) (noting, more broadly, that scholars have considered the concepts of resilience and 
adaptive capacity in a range of disciplines and have “recently have begun to consider how these [concepts] might 
inform the design of laws for discrete legal application.”).  Professor Ruhl offers what he believes is the first effort 
to “synthesize resilience theory in a framework relevant to lawyers.”  Id. at 1375. 
7 We demonstrate the value of this framework in both this article and a second article on dynamic governance, in 
which we engage in a thorough application of each of its components to the federal Environmental Protection 
Agency’s effort to transform its approach to compliance and enforcement.  See David L. Markell & Robert L. 
Glicksman, Dynamic Governance in Theory and Application, Part II (forthcoming). 
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focus on different mechanisms such as the use of rulemaking, permitting, and enforcement; and 
literatures that focus on tools.8  Ours is the first effort of which we are aware to offer a 
comprehensive framework that synthesizes these literatures in the context of dynamic 
governance.   
 
Figure 1 
 
                            
 
 
 
There is, of course, an important threshold question:  who should have the capacity to 
make the normative calls on whether and how to respond to change?  Ideally, Congress, the most 
accountable policymaking body, in tandem with the President, would direct agency responses.  
Multiple factors make that outcome unrealistic, however, including the multiple vetogates in the 
legislative process,9 the legislative gridlock that has characterized recent legislative sessions,10 
and the significant gap that often (and currently) exists between the policy agendas of Congress 
and the President.  If Congress and the President fail to jointly take the bull by the horns through 
the adoption of legislation, decisions to effect transformations are left to the President acting 
unilaterally (such as by an executive order reorganizing agency structures) or agencies exercising 
delegated discretionary authority. 11  If agencies take on the task of anticipating or responding to 
change in the absence of such action by the elected branches of government, a further question is 
whether they can be held accountable for the choices they make.  Agencies themselves can 
enhance their own accountability,12 but the courts often provide the ultimate mechanism for 
ensuring that agency action conforms to legislative mandates and the rule of law when they 
resolve challenges to agency action.13   
8 For discussion of each of these literatures and how they might influence policy choices relating to each of the three 
components of our dynamic governance framework, see Markell & Glicksman, supra note 7. 
9 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY, ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 79-81 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing vetogates).   
10 See, e.g., Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 2217 (2013). 
11 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 
115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015) (discussing unorthodox lawmaking strategies in response to partisan gridlock, 
among other factors). 
12 See Emily Hammond & David L. Markell, Administrative Proxies for Judicial Review: Building Legitimacy from 
the Inside-Out, 37 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 313, 319 (2013) (discussing the concept of inside-out governance when 
agency accountability through judicial review is likely to be limited). 
13 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, 2016 WL 207257 (2016) (raising 
questions about the parameters for different actors to pursue policy initiatives in the administration and enforcement 
Optimal
Regulation
Actors
ToolsMechanisms
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 Regardless of whether Congress, the President, or the agency (or some combination of 
them) decides that regulatory redesign is needed in the face of change, policymakers will need to 
decide which actors should participate in effecting the transformation and what their respective 
roles should be.  Accordingly, the first element in our framework is designed to highlight the 
importance of identifying all of the relevant actors in any particular regulatory program and 
determining (or at least considering) the roles that each should play.  In addition to federal 
officials, policymakers should account for the significant role that state actors may play.  
Environmental regulation, for example, is typically undertaken through a “cooperative 
federalism” institutional structure that carves out roles for both EPA and the states.14  Citizens 
also have a role to play in this regulatory compliance regime, as do, obviously, regulated parties 
themselves.   
 
Policy design needs to consider how each of these actors can promote regulatory 
objectives in light of factors such as their respective capacities and the legitimacy of allocating 
implementation authority to each of them.  For example, in previous work we have demonstrated 
that use of a cooperative federalism system in the environmental laws has at times compromised 
the legitimacy of the regulatory state by undermining accountability and transparency.15  Policy 
design that is based on a cooperative federalism approach should reflect an awareness of the 
potential for such a scheme to generate unintended consequences and presumably should include 
efforts to ameliorate those concerns.  Similarly, the use of private lawsuits to supplement 
government enforcement – including the “controversial . . . marked shift. . . away from 
administrative . . . enforcement and toward the use of private lawsuits” – has raised questions 
about the implications of such a shift for both regulatory effectiveness and accountability.16  
Increasing reliance on regulated parties to monitor their behavior similarly carries risks as well as 
benefits.  These examples illustrate the importance of considering in policy design both the full 
range of potential actors and the features of the mechanisms that enable different actors to 
participate.  
 
The second element of our framework implicates the legal mechanisms available to key 
actors in accomplishing transformational change in regulatory design.  The mechanisms 
potentially available to an agency include planning and other actions that bear on the regulatory 
infrastructure, the issuance of regulations, the issuance of permits, and the use of adjudication to 
of the immigration laws).  Congress can still try to play a role, such as by using its oversight authority or by enacting 
appropriations bills.  Further, it also may influence agency efforts to respond to change through the nature of the 
delegation it provides, but only if it adopts legislation that the President is willing to sign or if it is able to override a 
presidential veto. 
14 For a description of these respective roles under the Clean Air Act, and how some judges have grossly 
mischaracterized them, see Robert L. Glicksman & Jessica A. Wentz, Debunking Revisionist Understandings of 
Environmental Cooperative Federalism: Collective Action Responses to Air Pollution, in THE LAW AND POLICY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL FEDERALISM: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (Kalyani Robbins & Erin Ryan, eds.) (Edward Elgar 
Pub., 2016). 
15 David Markell, “Slack” in the Administrative State and Its Implications for Governance: The Issue of 
Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Markell, Slack].  
16 See, e.g., David F. Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 619 (2013).  We examine 
below citizens’ capacity to participate in governance through enforcement adjudication and other mechanisms.  See 
infra Part V. 
DRAFT - Article is forthcoming in Issue 58:3 of the Arizona Law Review
enforce regulatory violations.17  Those responsible for regulatory design should consider all of 
the available mechanisms.  Further, they should evaluate the potential roles of different actors in 
implementing each available mechanism.  For example, the significant shift from public to 
private enforcement as a regulatory tool reflects the importance of considering the types of 
enforcement mechanisms that should be included in a legal regime, including the features that 
each such mechanism should possess.18   
 
A third set of questions involves an assessment of the tools at policymakers’ disposal to 
advance regulatory transformation in response to the dynamic character of challenges and 
opportunities.  In the context of agency enforcement programs, for example, the relevant tools 
are likely to include monitoring and reporting regimes as well as features to enhance the 
transparency of compliance status and efforts to address it.  In other regulatory contexts, the tools 
will necessarily differ.  Further, tools that once have served regulatory objectives well may be 
inadequate if the regulatory environment has shifted, and new or more sophisticated versions of 
old tools may become available as a result of technological changes or other innovations. The 
types of tools available may well affect the roles that different actors, including government 
officials, regulated parties, and citizens, should be expected and empowered to play.  Similarly, 
an agency engaged in redesign should consider how best to use available legal and non-legal 
mechanisms to promote desired use of different tools by different actors.  Thus, all three 
variables in our framework need to be considered both independently and in tandem.   
 
To illustrate the value of this three-pronged framework for designing regulatory programs 
and other governance mechanisms in ways that accommodate change, we begin, in Part II, by 
reviewing the ubiquity of change that implicates regulatory regimes and several of its triggers.  
In Parts III and IV, we then ground our conceptual framework by applying it to the federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s ongoing effort to transform its approach to regulatory 
enforcement because of the agency’s perception that changing circumstances required dramatic 
changes in governance approaches.  Part III reviews some of the more significant traditional 
challenges EPA has faced in promoting compliance with the environmental laws, as well as 
some of the emerging challenges that are causing the regulatory landscape to shift beneath its 
feet.  Part IV briefly summarizes EPA’s recent, and still evolving, Next Generation Compliance 
(Next Gen) initiative to transform EPA enforcement in light of these traditional and emerging 
challenges.  EPA describes Next Gen as embodying a “new paradigm” for promoting 
compliance.19  In Part V we describe in general terms the advantages of the three-pronged 
conceptual framework we offer in regulatory policy design.  We also show how use of our 
framework to consider the roles of citizens provides insights about design that might not 
otherwise emerge in the policy discussion about regulatory redesign.  This case study illustrates 
the benefits of our framework both conceptually, and to real-world policy design.  The 
17 See, e.g., Edward Rubin, It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
95, 97 (2003) (listing priority setting, resource allocation, research, planning, targeting, guidance, and strategic 
enforcement, in addition to rulemaking and adjudication, as “modes of governance”). 
18 The citizen suit provisions of many of the federal environmental statutes illustrate the nuanced nature of this issue.  
Features include the possibility of recouping attorneys’ and other fees in certain circumstances, the possibility of 
preemption, the need for adequate notice, and the possibility of mootness, among others.  See, e.g., Symposium, 
Environmental Citizen Suits at Thirtysomething: A Celebration and Summit, Parts I & II, 10 WIDENER L. REV. 
Issues 1 & 2 (2003-2004). 
19 Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 30 ENVTL. F. 22, 22 (Sept.-Oct. 2013).   
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discussion in Part V sets the stage for the more detailed review of actors, mechanisms, and tools 
in the second of our two articles on Dynamic Governance.  In that article, we continue to explore 
EPA’s Next Generation effort more thoroughly, using it as a case study to illustrate how the use 
of our framework might improve administration of that (and other) regulatory programs by 
identifying insights as to the proper combination of actors, mechanisms, and tools that are less 
likely to emerge from EPA’s reconceptualization of environmental compliance and enforcement 
structures.   
 
II.   Regulatory Dynamism Triggers 
   
Effective regulatory design, including the design of enforcement programs, requires an 
understanding of the manner in which the regulatory environment, within and outside the 
agency, has shifted or is likely to shift over time and how those shifts affect the capacity of 
existing structures, programs, and strategies to achieve regulatory goals through the roles 
assigned to relevant actors, mechanisms, and tools.20  Several factors may account for the 
existence of a dynamic regulatory environment, any of which may present challenges to 
policymakers seeking to craft and administer effective regulatory programs.21  This part 
introduces some of the most important triggers for regulatory dynamism. 
 
 A. Changes in the Physical World 
 
Changes in the physical world may create a need for changes in regulatory strategies.22  
These changes are obviously of critical importance to the development of environmental law.  As 
Blake Hudson has recognized, “[o]ur world is composed of dynamic natural resources.  In the 
natural environment forests burn, rivers flood, sea levels rise, and climate changes. . . .  Instead 
of continuing to allow dynamic shifts in resource use and preservation to outpace legal and 
policy solutions, a key challenge faced by modern society is to find congruity between the shifts 
and the solutions.”23  Hudson argues, for example, that new threats facing forest resources in the 
United States have triggered a need for an overhaul of the legal regulatory framework for forest 
management, and that an appropriate response is the creation of minimum federal forest 
management standards.24   
 
Physical changes can prompt public values shifts or statutory changes that alter 
regulatory dynamics.25  Crisis, often accompanied by physical change, has repeatedly been a spur 
20 See David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1, 40 
(2014). 
21 See David M. Driesen, Legal Theory Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 40 J. CORP. L. 55, 91 (2014) (arguing that 
“one cannot optimize the regulation of a dynamic system that makes frequent changes”). 
22  Under the “population ecology strain” of organizational theory, “an organization’s behaviors are understood 
primarily as responses to external stimuli which encourage the organization to find a niche.”  Gwen Arnold & 
Forrest D. Fleischman, The Influence of Organizations and Institutions on Wetland Policy Stability: The Rapanos 
Case, 4 POL’Y STUDIES J. 343, 350 (2013).  These stimuli can include changes in the physical environment that 
affect the need for regulation to address impacts regulated entities’ behavior or the manner in which regulation 
should operate. 
23 Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1645-46 (2014). 
24 Id. at 1647; see also id. at 668 (calling for “a new wave of regulatory dynamism”). 
25 See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State’s Affirmative Duty to Protect Property, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 345, 371 (2014) (arguing that when “community needs are dynamic, the state’s role in constituting property 
DRAFT - Article is forthcoming in Issue 58:3 of the Arizona Law Review
to the adoption of new laws or regulations or the revision of existing laws that shift the focus of 
regulators (often by expanding their responsibilities).  Certainly this dynamic is reflected in the 
development of environmental law.  Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 after the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska in 1989.26  The massive Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf 
of Mexico in 2010 prompted the Obama Administration to reorganize the agencies responsible 
for permitting and regulating offshore oil exploration and production.27  It also spurred Congress 
to adopt the Resources and Ecosystems Sustainability, Tourist Opportunities, and Revived 
Economies of the Gulf Coast States Act of 2012 (the RESTORE Act),28 which, among other 
things, requires the Treasury Secretary to deposit 80 percent of administrative and civil penalties 
paid under the Clean Water Act by responsible parties in connection with the Deepwater Horizon 
incident into a trust fund that will finance activities relating to ecological and economic 
restoration in the Gulf states.29  Physical changes that trigger the need for regulatory responses 
can also be gradual, however.  EPA, for example, identified hydrologic change, which may be 
gradual or abrupt,30 as a reason, among others, to alter a 30-year old set of regulations governing 
the establishment and review of state water quality standards under the Clean Water Act.31   
 
B. Newly-Discovered Challenges and Mid-Course Corrections 
 
Congress may amend existing statutory programs or create new ones even in the absence 
of physical change.  Policymakers’ assessments that existing statutory programs are not 
effectively achieving preexisting legislative goals may spur statutory or regulatory changes.32  
Congress adopted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act in 1980 largely because of its belief that the laws in effect did not provide the necessary 
firepower to respond to the discovery of the Love Canal and other sites contaminated with 
rights must also be dynamic.  Regulations and obligations that were not justifiable before may become so over time . 
. . .”); John Robinson, Jr., Rural Ozone Pollution: New Science, Old Rules, 8 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 
149, 174 (2014) (“Dynamic regulations that can adjust quickly in response to new science, or to meet new public-
health-related goals, should be the target.”). 
26 ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY 990 (7th ed. Wolters-Kluwer 
2015). 
27 Michael LeVine, Peter Van Tuyn & Layla Hughes, Oil and Gas in America’s Arctic Ocean: Past Problems 
Counsel Precaution, 37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1271, 1370 n.198 (2014); David Hults, Environmental Regulation at 
the Frontier: Government Oversight of Offshore Oil Drilling North of Alaska, 44 ENVTL. L. 761, 832 n.7 (2014)  
28 Pub. L. No. 112-141, §§ 1601-1608, 126 Stat. 405, 588-607 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1321 note). 
29 See Gerald J. Pels & Julia C. Rinne, The RESTORE Act: Legislation That Works for the Gulf Coast, 27-Spg. NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 40 (2013). 
30 See Charles Rougé, Yan Ge & Ximing Cai, Detecting Gradual and Abrupt Changes in Hydrological Records, 53 
ADVANCES IN WATER RESOURCES 33 (Mar. 2013). 
31 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Quality Standards Regulatory Revisions; Final rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 
51,020, 51,021 (Aug. 21, 2015): 
Since 1983 . . . diverse and complex challenges have arisen, including new types of contaminants, pollution 
stemming from multiple sources, extreme weather events, hydrologic alteration, and climate change-related 
impacts.  These challenges necessitate a more effective, flexible and practicable approach for the 
implementation of WQS and protecting water quality.  Additionally, extensive experience with WQS 
implementation by states, authorized tribes, and EPA revealed a need to update the regulation to help meet 
these challenges. 
32 See, e.g., Markell & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 39 (identifying “reality checks” by policymakers assessing past 
regulatory performance as a key aspect of regulatory design). 
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hazardous waste.33  Another well-known example is Congress’s decision after nearly 25 years of 
experience with water pollution legislation enacted in 1948 to shift in 1972 statutory 
amendments from a regime centered on water quality-based approaches to controlling pollution 
to one that relies on technology-based regulatory standards.  Congress made this shift because 
implementation of the 1948 legislation highlighted the difficulty of proving cause-and-effect 
relationships between particular discharges and receiving water quality, for purposes of both 
adoption and enforcement of standards.34  Even if legislatures do not respond to change by 
altering statutes, agency officials may decide that they need to alter their strategies to redress 
deficiencies in existing regulatory practices, including but not limited to enforcement matters.35   
 
C. Changes in the Nature or Operation of the Regulated Community 
 
An additional driver of regulatory dynamism is change in the industry being regulated, 
whether it takes the form of unprecedented, dramatic change or ongoing, less revolutionary 
change.  Such changes may be the product of shifts in the operation of relevant product or 
service markets such as the entry of new product or service providers into those markets, or the 
development of new technologies.36  It is accepted wisdom that regulatory agencies often have a 
difficult time keeping pace with technological change, particularly when it is rapid.37  Such 
change has the potential to disrupt the functioning of regulatory programs if they alter the 
manner in which regulated entities operate in ways that were not anticipated by regulation or that 
33 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 108 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2004); David L. 
Markell, The Federal Superfund Program: Proposals for Strengthening the Federal/State Relationship, 18 WM. & 
MARY J. ENVTL. L. 1, 7-8 (1993). 
34 See Robert L. Glicksman & Mathew R. Batzel, Science, Politics, Law, and the Arc of the Clean Water Act: The 
Role of Assumptions in the Adoption of a Pollution Control Landmark, 32 WASH. U. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 99, 118-21 
(2010).  Other examples of this kind of mid-course correction in regulatory programs based on past regulatory 
deficiencies are legion.  See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 434-35 (describing deadline extensions, 
overhaul of existing regulatory provisions, and the creation of supplemental air pollution control programs in the 
1977 and 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act). 
35 See, e.g., Julia Lopez, Formalizing the Segmentation of Workers’ Rights: Tensions among Regulatory Levels, 36 
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 281, 282 (2015) (discussing the effects of rise of soft law strategies). 
36 Cf. Kerri Lynn Stone, Teaching the Post-Sex Generation, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 223, 230 (2013) (“Since 
employment discrimination jurisprudence is always trying to outpace the behavior that it regulates, it remains 
dynamic and continually evolves.”). 
37 Gregory N. Mandel & Gary E. Marchant, The Living Regulatory Challenges of Synthetic Biology, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 155, 162 (2014) (“Regulatory systems, almost always, are designed for technologies existing at the time of the 
regulatory systems’ formation and are based on the then-current understanding of that technology. Such systems 
often face difficulty and disruption when applied to newly emerging technologies.”); see also Joseph J. Norton, 
“International Financial Law,” an Increasingly Important Component of “International Economic Law”: A Tribute 
to Professor John H. Jackson, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 133, 143 (1999) (discussing regulators’ need to “catch up” with 
international financial market developments, “which are coming about with an almost unnerving speed as a result of 
the accelerated rate of technological innovation”); Rebecca M. Bratspies, A Regulatory Wake-Up Call: Lessons from 
BP’s Deepwater Horizon Disaster, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. ENVTL. L.J. 7, 60 (2011) (discussing Minerals Management 
Service failure “to keep up with the technological innovations developed in the private sector”); Urs Gasser, 
Regulating Search Engines: Taking Stock and Looking Ahead, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 201 (2006) (“The history of 
technology-regulation is rich with examples of outdated laws.”); Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to 
Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1583 (2003) (“[D]rastic changes in the technological and business 
environment surrounding television have yet to effect corresponding changes in the regulatory approach taken by 
Congress and the FCC”); Alan Heinrich, Karl Manheim & David J. Steele, At the Crossroads of Law and 
Technology, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1035, 1042 (2000) (“[T]he rapid and dynamic pace of change undermines the 
effectiveness of traditional legislative solutions.”). 
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do not fit current regulatory assumptions,38 models, or objectives.39  For example, the application 
of existing laws to new technologies may be unclear, creating uncertainty as to the nature of 
regulatory obligations.40  EPA has recognized the need for clarity as an important feature if it is 
to hope for high levels of regulatory compliance, as we discuss below.41   
 
The telecommunications, information technology, finance, chemical, and energy 
industries are obvious examples of industries undergoing recent upheavals that have created 
challenges for regulators.42  In the telecommunications industry, among others, the arrival of new 
technologies has created products or services that blurred the jurisdictional boundaries of 
multiple regulators,43 created “open regulatory space” that attracted the attention of regulators,44 
38 See Ronald F. Wright, Letters from Beyond the Regulatory State After the Rights Revolution: 100 YALE L.J. 825, 
851 n.38 (1990) (book review) (“The factual assumptions regarding some regulatory statutes, such as banking or 
telecommunications laws, may be undermined by technological or social changes.”). 
39 See William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1616 (2014) (arguing that 
“disruptive technologies and deregulation have dramatically reduced the importance of the basic public utility 
model”); Dominic E. Markwordt, More Folly Than Fairness: The Fairness Doctrine, the First Amendment, and the 
Internet Age, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 405, 450 (2010) (discussing the weakening of the Fairness Doctrine’s rationale 
due to technological change); Saule Omarova & Adam Feibelman, Risks, Rules, and Institutions: A Process for 
Reforming Financial Regulation, 39 U. MEM. L. REv. 881, 906 (2009) (noting that assumptions built into the 
framework for financial services regulation remained unquestioned, and that “the implications of the radical 
transformation in the risk profile of modern financial institutions were not sufficiently understood or even 
acknowledged”); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1200-01 (1999) “[A] 
change in a technological ‘fact,’ even if apparently unrelated to the law, may nonetheless have large unexpected 
effects on the operation of that law.”). 
40 See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Securities Regulation of Private Offerings in the Cyberspace Era: Legal 
Translation, Advertising and Business Context, 37 U. TOL. L. REV. 331, 363 (2006) (discussing securities 
regulation). 
41 See infra Part IVB.1.  Among other things, uncertainty can interfere with the intended deterrent effect of available 
sanctions.  See Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Technological Change: The Example of in 
Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 505, 569 (2005) (“In the context of technological change, there is a 
risk that application of existing rules will appear uncertain (reducing their deterrent effect) or existing rules will, on 
their terms, be under-inclusive.  In either case, rules designed to address a particular problem may fail to prevent 
similar problems because they were not crafted in contemplation of future technological changes.”). 
42 See, e.g., Andrew Erber, The Effective Prohibition Preemption in Modern Wireless Tower Siting, 66 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 357, 386 (2014) (referring to the telecommunications industry as “an increasingly dynamic and convergent 
sector); Christopher S. Yoo, Technological Determinism and Its Discontents, 127 HARV. L. REV. 914, 938 (2014) 
(referring to the industry as one “undergoing . . . dynamic change”); Jamie Darin Prenkert & Scott J. Shackelford, 
Business, Human Rights, and the Promise of Polycentricity, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 451, 455 (2014) (citing 
scholarship favoring the adoption of dynamic regulatory models in cyber law); Wulf A. Kaal, Dynamic Regulation 
of the Financial Services Industry, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 791, 800 (2013) (discussing possible role of dynamic 
elements in financial regulation); Thomas J. Brennan & Andrew W. Lo, Dynamic Loss Probabilities and 
Implications for Financial Regulation, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 678, 692 (2014) (citing “the need for dynamic 
leverage regulation that takes into account feedback effects and the endogeneity of volatility to the regulated 
financial system”); Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution, Hydraulic 
Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 145, 201 (2013) (calling for 
dynamic regulation in the face of “the shale revolution”). 
43 William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission as Convenor: Developing Regulatory Policy Norms Without 
Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17, 24 (2015) (jurisdictional conflict between the FCC and FTC due 
to the development of broadband); K.A.D. Camara, Costs of Sovereignty, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 385, 432 (2005) 
(referring to increase in frequency and intensity of conflicts between state regulatory interests as technological 
change expands the geographic impact of conduct). 
44 The development of the internet is one example.  See Babette E.L. Boliek, FCC Regulation Versus Antitrust: How 
Net Neutrality Is Defining the Boundaries, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1627, 1648 (2011); Lyombe Eko, American 
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and unified local markets into broader national and international markets, making businesses 
accountable to a larger number of regulatory regimes.45  The development of nanotechnology is 
another example of technology-driven shifts in the nature of products subject to regulation.  It 
has posed significant problems for environmental regulatory programs that were not crafted to 
deal with chemical substances with the properties of nanomaterials.46  Technological innovation 
may expand the range of entities able to offer products or services, such as banking services, 
which are subject to regulation.47  Technological changes in other “networked industries,” such 
as energy, have spurred innovations in regulatory ventures involving both federal and state 
agencies.  The significant expansion in the scale and geography of shale gas development made 
possible by advances in exploratory and horizontal drilling technologies, among other factors, 
has required many states to “rapidly ramp up regulatory abilities” and triggered other governance 
reactions intended to keep pace with a rapidly evolving industry.48  In short, as scholars have 
recognized, “a dynamic industry requires dynamic regulation.”49   
 
D. Changes in Technological and Other Forms of Governance Capacity  
Exceptionalism, the French Exception, Intellectual Property Law, and Peer-to-Peer File Sharing on the Internet, 10 
J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 95, 108 (2010). 
45 See Bob Rowe, Substance Plus Process—Telecom Regulation Reforms to Protect Consumers, Preserve Universal 
Service, and Promote Competition, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 879, 879-80 (2000).  The same phenomenon has occurred 
in other industries.  See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 42.  Cf. John T. Soma & Eric K. Weingarten, Multinational 
Economic Network Effects and the Need for an International Antitrust Response from the World Trade 
Organization: A Case Study in Broadcast-Media and News Corporation, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 41, 43 (2000) 
(“The rapid pace of technological innovation often blurs once separate product markets into cohesive wholes.”). 
46 See Jeffery T. Morris, A Case for the Commonplace: Locating Nanotechnology Within Existing Regulatory 
Frameworks, 55 JURIMETRICS J. 179, 179 (2015) (noting novel governance issues resulting from the emergency of 
nanotechnology).  Morris adds that “the notion of treating the same chemical substance differently if it is produced 
at the nanoscale remains an unresolved issue—even after more than a decade of discussion.”  Id. at 182. 
47 See Vivienne A. Lawack, Mobile Money, Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity: The South African Case, 8 
WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 317, 343 (2013); Shanthi Elizabeth Senthe, Transformative Technology in Microfinance: 
Delivering Hope Electronically?, 13 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 1, 39 (2012). Technological innovation, however, 
can also promote deregulation. See, e.g., Steven M. Spaeth, The Deregulation of Transportation and Natural Gas 
Production in the United States and Its Relevance to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 1990’s, 12 U. 
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 43, 95 (1991) (referring to communications deregulation). 
48 Mitchell J. Small et al., Risks and Risk Governance in Unconventional Shale Gas Development, 48 ENVTL. SCI. & 
TECH. 8289, 8290-93 (2014) (discussing the changes in technology that have contributed to improved capacity to 
develop shale gas deposits and accompanying regulatory issues); Hannah J. Wiseman, Remedying Regulatory 
Diseconomies of Scale, 94 B.U. L. REV. 235 (2014) (discussing the enormous changes in scale in fracturing); 
Hannah J. Wiseman, Risk and Response in Fracturing Policy, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 729, 737 (2013) (same)). 
49 Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law without Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 537 
(2015); see also Adam Adler, High Frequency Regulation: A New Model for Market Monitoring, 39 VT. L. REV. 
161, 164-65 (2014) (urging development of complex, dynamic, and flexible regulation algorithms in response to 
problems caused by dynamic trading algorithms); Deirdre McCann & Jill Murray, Prompting Formalisation 
Through Labour Market Regulation: A “Framed Flexibility” Model for Domestic Work, 43 INDUS. L.J. 319, 321, 
335 (2014) (changes in informal labor markets). 
 Regulatory responses to technological changes may be ineffective in achieving regulatory goals if 
policymakers do not fully appreciate their implications.  See, e.g., Eli P. Fenichel et al., Measuring the value of 
groundwater and other forms of natural capital, www.pnas.org/cgi/10.1073/pnas.1513779113, 
http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2016/02/04/1513779113.full.pdf (concluding that “[b]y failing to anticipate and 
mitigate the perverse consequences” of farmers’ technological transition to a new, high-efficiency irrigation nozzle, 
“statewide ‘investments’ in improved technology” resulted in less conservation-oriented agricultural practices and 
“destroyed wealth”).   
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 As noted in the previous section, changes in the nature of the regulated community, 
linked to technological developments or otherwise, can pose significant challenges for agencies.  
Technological change and other forms of change in governance capacity can affect regulatory 
programs in other ways, both positive and negative.  In some cases, improved capacity, through 
advances in technology and otherwise, may create significant opportunities for government to 
improve its practices.  In the enforcement arena, for example, the beneficial regulatory 
byproducts of technological change can include improved (more thorough, more accurate, and 
more timely) identification of compliance issues, better communication internally and externally 
about compliance concerns, and more rational enforcement response when necessary.   
 
New technologies that facilitate monitoring of or reporting on the effects of regulated 
activities may facilitate regulators’ ability to turn a dynamic regulatory environment to their 
advantage by providing access to previously unavailable information relevant to compliance.  By 
enabling the government to identify violations that otherwise likely would have remained 
undiscovered, and to develop cases much more easily, such information can lead to improved 
and better informed exercise of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether and how to address 
violations.50   
 
Environmental regulatory enforcement clearly demonstrates this development.  Gathering 
information sufficient to support enforcement actions has always been a challenge.51  Recent 
advances in areas such as electrical engineering can mitigate these challenges in the enforcement 
context by revolutionizing pollution monitoring.52  These technologies produce data that are 
more finely grained than cruder, previously available data and that can be more helpful in 
identifying environmental conditions, violations, and violators.53  Geographic information 
systems, global positioning satellite technologies, and remote sensing devices already support the 
investigation and enforcement of environmental laws in ways that were not previously 
possible.54  EPA has begun to institutionalize the use of enhanced monitoring capacity through 
50 See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal & Timothy A. Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on 
Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993-2013, 70 BUS. LAW. 61, 116 (2015); cf. David A. Hyman & William E. 
Kovacic, Why Who Does What Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1446, 1466 (2014) (“Technological dynamism creates new regulatory issues—and an opportunity for ambitious 
regulators to expand their domain.”).  For further discussion of the effects of new technology on enforcement, see 
infra §§ IIB.2-4. 
51 See infra § IIA.1. 
52 These include microfabrication techniques; microelectro-mechanical systems that can incorporate microfluidic, 
optical, and nanotube elements; energy efficient radios and sensor circuits that have extremely low power 
consumption; and advanced computing power suitable for handling extremely large databases.  See Emily G. Snyder 
et al., The Changing Paradigm of Air Pollution Monitoring, 47 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 11369, 11369 (2013), 
http://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/es4022602.  Dave Owen suggests that “increased data availability, new software 
systems, and exponentially greater computer power have combined to turn spatial analysis – that is quantitative 
analysis of data coded to specific geographic coordinates – into the coin of the environmental realm.”  Dave Owen, 
Mapping, Modeling, and the Fragmentation of Environmental Law, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 219, 222.   
53 For discussion of the challenges facing the collection and use of ambient monitoring data, see Eric Biber, The 
Challenge of Collecting and Using Environmental Monitoring Data, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 68 (2013), available at 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol18/iss4/art68/.  
54 See Peter Stokely, Using Aerial Photography, Geospatial Data, and GIS to Support the Enforcement of 
Environmental Statutes, 28-Summer NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 38 (2013).  Remote sensing is “the science and art 
of obtaining information about an object, area, or phenomenon through the analysis of data acquired by a device not 
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ventures such as its E-Enterprise for the Environment, which is a joint EPA-state effort that 
includes applying advanced information to streamline information collection.55 
 
Advances in monitoring and reporting technology can strengthen the capacity of not only 
regulators, but also regulated entities and non-governmental entities to detect and address 
violations.  This enhanced third party capacity presents opportunities for regulators to transform 
the shape of governance by improving coordination among a wide range of stakeholders in 
identifying and addressing noncompliance.  EPA has historically relied heavily on compliance 
self-reporting, including discharge monitoring reports that point sources must submit under the 
Clean Water Act’s National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit program56 
and the hazardous waste manifests that those handling hazardous waste must prepare under the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.57  Congress recently required EPA to establish a new 
electronic manifest reporting system.58  According to EPA, the new system will “yield 
significant savings over the current paper manifest and will ease the reporting burden” for 
regulated entities.59  It will “establish for the first time a national repository of manifest data, and 
a means to efficiently share manifest data with our authorized state partners and with the 
public.”60  EPA identified the following benefits of the new system: 
 
(1) Improved access to higher quality and more timely waste shipment data; (2) nearly real-time 
shipment tracking capabilities for users; (3) enhanced manifest inspection and enforcement 
capabilities for regulators; (4) more rapid notification and responses to problems or discrepancies 
encountered with shipments or deliveries; (5) greater access for emergency responders about the 
types and sources of hazardous waste that are in movement between generator sites and waste 
management facilities; (6) one-stop manifest copy submission to EPA and to all interested states 
through the Exchange Network architecture; (7) greater transparency for the public about 
completed hazardous waste shipments to or from their communities; and (8) new data 
management possibilities that could ultimately simplify the RCRA biennial reporting 
requirements and consolidate various federal and state reporting requirements for domestic and 
transboundary shipments.61 
 
in contact with the object, area, or phenomenon under investigation.”  Kenneth J. Markowitz, Legal Challenges and 
Market Rewards to the Use and Acceptance of Remote Sensing and Digital Information as Evidence, 12 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 219, 221 (2002); see also Gregg P. Macey, The Architecture of Ignorance, 2013 UTAH L. 
REV. 1627, 1648; Nate Seltenrich, Remote-Sensing Applications for Environmental Health Research, 122 ENVTL. 
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES A269 (Oct. 2014), http://ehp.niehs.nih.gov/122-a268/.  
55 Environmental Protection Agency, About E-Enterprise for the Environment, http://www2.epa.gov/e-
enterprise/about-e-enterprise-environment#Core of E-Enterprise; see also Snyder et al., supra note 51, at 11375 
(discussing the role of advances in air pollution sensors in E-Enterprise); EPA Budget in Brief FY 2016, at 63, 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-02/documents/fy_2016_bib_combined_v5.pdf (noting that the 
“Next Generation Compliance initiative [discussed in Parts III and IV of this Article] is aligned with the larger EPA 
E-Enterprise business strategy, which is jointly managed with the states.”). 
56 See 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(l)(4)(i). 
57 See 40 C.F.R. § 262.20(a)(1). 
58 Hazardous Waste Electronic Manifest Establishment Act, Pub. L. No. 112-195, 126 Stat. 1452 (2012) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 6939g).  EPA’s implementing regulations are codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.24-262.25. 
59 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous Waste Management System; Modification of the Hazardous 
Waste Manifest System; Electronic Manifests, 79 Fed. Reg. 7518, 7523 (Feb. 7, 2014). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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Greater reliance on self-reporting by regulated entities to identify violations also poses 
risks, however.  The prospect of increased reliance on regulated entities to supply and interpret 
information relating to compliance status, which is likely as a result of increased use of advanced 
monitoring techniques, may be perceived as exacerbating a “fox guarding the henhouse” 
problem.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) raised concerns decades ago that 
EPA’s water pollution and hazardous waste management programs lacked adequate controls to 
detect error or fraud in sampling data.62  Others have raised similar concerns.63  Results from a 
recent study from Norway, for example, show evidence of severe under-reporting to Norway’s 
EPA of violations when regulated parties self-audit, the substantial specific deterrence effect on 
parties that were audited by regulators (resulting in reduction in likelihood of non-compliance 
the next year by 37%), and the lack of any evidence suggesting that announcing higher audit 
frequency improves compliance behavior. 64  The author emphasizes that the evidence of under-
reporting in self-audits raises serious concerns that a shift toward reliance on self-reporting by 
environmental agencies could undermine regulatory compliance.65  To the extent that new 
monitoring and reporting technology is more reliable, less capable of being manipulated, and 
more easily replicated because of reductions in cost, greater mobility and other factors,  it may 
operate to increase the accuracy, reliability, and credibility of self-reporting and diminish the 
risks associated with a regulatory regime that depends on heavy (and growing) quasi-privatized 
monitoring.  
 
Technological advances also provide opportunities to better integrate the public into the 
regulatory enforcement process, yielding a variety of benefits.  If citizens and communities assist 
in data collection, they become more educated about environmental issues, which assists them in 
developing community-based strategies to protect public health.66  The use of enhanced 
monitoring technology at the “fenceline” of regulated sources increases the potential to detect 
regulatory violations.  EPA and state agencies have already begun to require regulated facilities 
to set up passive monitoring systems to measure environmental conditions at the fenceline by 
incorporating such requirements into consent decrees and other settlements,67 and EPA has used 
its regulatory authority to establish fenceline monitoring requirements for sources that emit 
hazardous air pollutants as well.68  This monitoring can strengthen the deterrent impact of 
62 U.S. General Accounting Office, Environmental Enforcement: EPA Cannot Assure the Accuracy of Self-Reported 
Compliance Monitoring Data, GAO/RCED-93-21, at 3 (March 1993), http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/153286.pdf.  
63 EPA’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) has criticized EPA’s oversight mechanisms to prevent the submission of 
fraudulent data by external laboratories with which it contracts to provide environmental testing data.  EPA, Office 
of Inspector General, EPA Has Not Implemented Adequate Management Procedures to Address Potential 
Fraudulent Environmental Data, Report No. 14-P-0270 (May 29, 2014),  
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2014/20140529-14-P-0270.pdf [hereinafter Fraudulent Data]; see also U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, Pesticide Safety: Improvements Needed in EPA’s Good Laboratory Practices 
Inspection Program, GAO-14-289 (May 15, 2014), available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-289.  
64 Professor Kjetil Telle, Monitoring and Enforcement of Environmental Regulations: Lessons from a Natural Field 
Experiment in Norway, 99 J. PUBL. ECON. 24 (2013). 
65 Id. at 24. 
66 See Snyder et al., supra note 51, at 11373 (discussing crowd sourcing to develop “citizen science”). 
67 Alec C. Zacaroli, Clean Air Act: New Developments that Are Redefining the Enforcement Landscape, 45 ENV’T 
REP. (BNA) 3108 (Oct. 24, 2014). 
68 See Petroleum Refinery Sector Risk and Technology Review and New Source Performance Standards; Final rule, 
80 Fed. Reg. 75,178, 75,191-200 (Dec. 1, 2015); id. at 75,254-57 (codified at 40 C.F.R.§ 63. 658) (requiring 
refineries to deploy passive fenceline monitoring).  One observer speculated at the time this rule was proposed that it 
would “likely will become the standard for other sources as well.”  Zacaroli, supra note 66.  A recent EPA OIG 
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regulations and foster higher compliance levels if regulated entities recognize that the data make 
it easier for enforcers, public and private, to prove violations or if they simply want to avoid the 
adverse public reaction stemming from disclosure of regulatory violations.69  Some contend that, 
even in a time of declining EPA and state enforcement resources,70 the emergence of new 
monitoring technology will increase the chance that regulatory violations will be detected, as 
enforcement activity shifts from the government to broader networks that include community 
groups and other non-governmental entities.71  Some of the new monitoring technology is 
available to the public at little or no cost from federal or state agencies,72 creating community 
“bucket brigades.”73  In addition, EPA has provided technical assistance to help individuals and 
citizen groups (as well as regulated sources) use the new monitoring technology.74  This dynamic 
will allow EPA to rely more on new governance mechanisms that integrate non-governmental 
entities into compliance and enforcement processes.75  New information technologies will also 
affect federalism choices, such as by facilitating coordination among jurisdictions through easier 
information sharing.76 
 
 As is the case for greater reliance on regulated entities’ self-monitoring, increased 
reliance on citizens for such monitoring poses risks as well as benefits.  A lack of capacity to use 
technology properly or to interpret information correctly may lead to misunderstandings and 
false positives, and divert attention from more important concerns.  Also, as we discuss below,77 
new data that leads to a more substantial level of citizen suit enforcement activity will pose 
coordination challenges for agency lawyers and other personnel.  Agency enforcers will need to 
report highlights the need for monitoring of commitments embodied in consent decrees.  U.S. EPA OIG, EPA Can 
Reduce Risk of Undetected Clean Air Act Violations Through Better Monitoring of Settlements Agreements 16, 
Report No. 15-P-0277 (Sept. 10, 2015) [hereinafter OIG, Reduce Risk] (concluding that EPA had not “ensure[d]” 
compliance with requirements embodied in the consent decrees the OIG reviewed). 
69 See Zacaroli, supra note 66 (arguing that “communities that have the ability to gather air quality data create a ‘big 
motivator’ for companies to more closely monitor their own emissions”); see also Markowitz, supra note 53, at 228-
29.  Earlier iterations of improved data collection technologies have had that effect.  See, e.g., Lesley K. McAllister, 
Enforcing Cap-and-Trade: A Tale of Two Programs, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 1, 4-8 (2010) 
(describing how continuous emissions monitoring equipment and automatic verification systems bolstered 
compliance levels under the CAA’s acid rain program). 
70 See infra § IIB.1. 
71 See Zacaroli, supra note 66. 
72 Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 156-57 (2004) (noting 
that new monitoring technologies may revolutionize responses to environmental problems); see also Snyder et al., 
supra note 51, at 11369; Peter Grabosky, Beyond Responsive Regulation: The Expanding Role of Non-State Actors 
in the Regulatory Process, 7 REG. & GOVERNANCE 114, 118 (2013). 
73 Biber, supra note 52.  Biber warns, however, that “many monitoring technologies are too expensive for most 
volunteer groups.”  Id.  See also Macey, supra note 53, at 1663 (arguing that “networked data render the public vital 
to government response”). 
74 See, e.g., EPA’s Air Sensor Toolbox for Citizen Scientists, http://www.epa.gov/heasd/airsensortoolbox/; see also 
Environmental Protection Agency, Air Sensor Guidebook, EPA 600/R-14/159, at vii (June 2014) (new technology 
may assist those interested in using lower cost air quality sensor technologies). 
75 See Macey, supra note 53, at 1665 (“The public’s role as true first responders will widen. . . .  Peer networks will 
provide data redundancy, and vulnerable populations will be motivated to share locations and contextual 
information.”); Owen, supra note 51, at 247 (“[T]echnological advances also can promote participation and 
inclusion.”). 
76 See Owen, supra note 51, at 273-78. 
77 See infra Part VA. 
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design regulatory enforcement programs in ways that maximize the benefits and minimize the 
risks arising from the use of new monitoring and reporting technologies. 
 
More generally, technological advances in compliance monitoring and reporting pose 
additional challenges for regulators, including enforcement personnel.  One challenge relates to 
privacy concerns that often accompany the accumulation of data not previously available.78  A 
second is the possibility that legislators or other policymakers concerned about shrinking 
resources in an era of budget-cutting will depict expenditures on monitoring as unnecessary and 
unjustified.79  A third is that, inherent in the increased use of quantitative data of any sort is the 
danger of manipulability, lack of transparency due to concealed modeling assumptions, and 
“false certainty.”80   
 
E. The Implications of Dynamism for Regulatory Design 
 
In the face of changes in regulatory landscapes in many fields, some of which have been 
dramatic, scholars have urged modification of the structure, as well as the content, of regulatory 
programs to accommodate change.  To take but one example, some scholars and policymakers 
have supported increased reliance on adaptive management, a decisionmaking methodology 
crafted specifically to deal with change.  Adaptive management seeks “to reduce uncertainty 
through integrative learning fostered in a structured, iterative decisionmaking process.  This 
approach is most relevant for dynamic regulatory contexts . . . in which uncertainty and 
controllability are high and risk is low.”81  Two proponents of adaptive management describe it 
as follows: 
 
The idea of adaptive management is that agencies should be free to make more decisions, but that 
the timing of those decisions is spread out into a continuous process that makes differentiating 
between the “front end” and the “back end” of decisionmaking much less relevant.  Rather than 
make one grand decision and move on, agencies employing adaptive management engage in a 
program of iterative decisionmaking following a structured, multistep protocol:  (1) definition of 
the problem, (2) determination of goals and objectives for management, (3) determination of the 
baseline, (4) development of conceptual models, (5) selection of future actions, (6) 
implementation and management actions, (7) monitoring, and (8) evaluation and return to step 
(1). . . .  With deep roots in natural resources management theory, the adaptive management 
protocol has begun to make inroads in public lands management in particular, though it has been 
applied or proposed in other policy contexts, including pollution control, financial regulation, 
environmental impact assessment, public health and safety, civil rights, and social welfare.82 
 
Other scholars have responded to the dynamism inherent in many contemporary governance 
issues, and the challenges dynamic conditions create for regulators, by urging other large-scale 
changes in governance approaches, such as greater reliance on self-regulation (a form of 
78 See Macey, supra note 53, at 1669 (discussing privacy and data security concerns stemming from the use of 
advanced monitoring technology). 
79 See Eric Biber, supra note 52 (referring to the vulnerability of politically meaningful monitoring to “asymmetric 
political pressure”). 
80 See Owen, supra note 51, at 224, 250 (identifying “opacity, manipulability, and false certainty that plague any 
complex and quantitative mode of analysis” and “concealed subjective choices” as limitations of spatial data). 
81 Craig & Ruhl, supra note 6, at 20. 
82 Id. at 7-8. 
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“reflexive regulation”),83 shifts in federal-state or international organization relationships,84 or 
greater use of incentives for the development of still more effective new technologies.85   
 
The challenges and opportunities facing regulators as they respond to changes of the kind 
identified in this part give rise to a plethora of issues relating to regulatory design.  The 
remainder of this article offers a framework intended to advance the effort to think critically 
about the governance challenges posed by dynamic regulatory environments and to address them 
effectively.  It does so by focusing on efforts to promote regulatory compliance, using 
environmental regulatory programs to illustrate the value of our framework.86  Our analysis is 
motivated in part by recent efforts by EPA to grapple with some of the challenges noted above, 
primarily under the auspices of its Next Generation Compliance Initiative.87  To further set the 
stage for this analysis, Part III discusses the regulatory dynamism triggers affecting EPA’s 
enforcement and compliance programs and the challenges that these changes have posed to 
EPA’s administration of those programs. 
 
III. Traditional and Emerging Challenges to Effective Compliance and Enforcement 
 
 The purpose of this part is to ground our theoretical framework through a case study of 
one agency’s regulatory landscape.  Our focus in this article is on environmental compliance, 
which has traditionally been under the domain of EPA.  We begin by taking account of how well 
or poorly EPA’s current enforcement program is functioning.  This part reviews the challenges 
EPA has faced and will face in pursuing its own enforcement agenda and in overseeing state 
enforcement under delegated environmental programs.  Section A surveys four longstanding sets 
of challenges to state and federal enforcement of the environmental laws.  Section B addresses 
four more recent sets of challenges that have made the task of enforcing environmental laws all 
the more daunting.  As part of our evaluation of EPA’s claim that transformation of its 
enforcement program is needed, this part summarizes the baseline circumstances that EPA 
confronts. 
83 See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 173 (2013); 
Robert F. Weber, An Alternative Story of the Law and Regulation of Risk Management, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1005, 
1017 (2013) (discussing devolution of discretion to the banking industry to address a dynamic and volatile 
regulatory environment). 
84 See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyberpeace: Managing Cyberattacks through Polycentric Governance, 62 
AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1360 (2013) (referring to dynamic, multilevel regulation to enhance cybersecurity); Blake 
Hudson & Jonathan Rosenbloom, Uncommon Approaches to Commons Problems: Nested Governance Commons 
and Climate Change, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 1273, 1293 & n.58 (2013) (citing calls for various versions of dynamic 
regulatory federalism in areas such as climate change regulation). 
85 See, e.g., Keith Hawkins, Enforcing Regulation: Robert Kagan's Contribution-and Some Questions, 38 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 950, 963 (2013).  Still others have recommended frequent updating of regulatory standards.  See, e.g., 
Wendy Wagner, Racing to the Top: How Regulation Can Be Used to Create Incentives for Industry to Improve 
Environmental Quality, 29 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 12 (2013); cf. Kaal, supra note 41, at 819 (“[R]ulemaking in 
a dynamic framework increasingly utilizes institution-specific and decentralized information reflecting preceding 
events and attempting to anticipate succeeding future contingencies.”).  
86 Our focus is on the major federal pollution control statutes, the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).   
87 EPA is also using other initiatives, such as E-Reporting, to address the emergence of new monitoring and 
reporting technologies.  See infra Part IVA.3.  In its proposed fiscal year 2016 budget, EPA identified as one of its 
five strategic goals protecting health and the environment through the use of Next Gen tools to achieve vigorous and 
targeted civil and criminal enforcement.  EPA Budget in Brief, supra note 54, at 61.  
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  A.  Traditional Enforcement Challenges 
   
1. Data Gaps 
 
“Data gaps haunt every scale of regulatory interest in environmental law . . . .”88  
According to Daniel Esty, these gaps affect problem identification, causal specification, 
evaluation of health and environmental impacts, valuation of harm, identification of rights, the 
nature of policy intervention, implementation, monitoring and enforcement, and updating and 
refinement.89  Information deficiencies certainly plague efforts to enforce the environmental 
laws, to assess whether current enforcement strategies need to be improved and, if so, what fixes 
to adopt.  EPA and state agencies sometimes lack complete information on the universe of 
regulated entities.90  They may not be aware of all the facilities that are covered by regulatory 
programs and, even when they have identified facilities subject to regulation, they may not be 
aware of all of the activities taking place at those facilities that trigger regulatory duties. 
 
Both EPA’s OIG and the GAO have noted these data deficiencies.91  The OIG reported in 
2005 that “OECA has limited knowledge of the regulated universe for which it maintains 
responsibility.”92  Nearly a decade later, the OIG noted continuing problems in this area, finding 
that “EPA relies on the number of permits issued as a proxy for the number of facilities regulated 
by the agency.  However, a single facility may have multiple permits, so the permit count is 
higher than the facility count. . . .  EPA does not know the location of all regulated facilities.  
This results in underreporting for the facility universe.”93  The GAO provided a specific example 
of EPA’s incomplete knowledge of the identity and location of sources subject to the regulatory 
programs it is responsible for enforcing.   EPA does not maintain complete information on new 
source review (NSR) permits issued to fossil fuel electricity generating units under the Clean Air 
Act.  Although state and local permitting agencies track the NSR permits they issue, for at least 
some source categories, such as fossil fuel electricity generating units, “EPA does not maintain 
88 Macey, supra note 53, at 1651; see generally Robert L. Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps Through Modeling and 
Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the National 
Forest Management Act, 83 IND. L.J. 465 (2008) (exploring the use of modeling by agencies to address data gaps). 
89 Esty, supra note 71, at 139 (Table 1). 
90 See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General, Limited Knowledge of the Universe of 
Regulated Entities Impedes EPA’s Ability to Demonstrate Changes in Regulatory Compliance, Report No. 2005-P-
00024, at 7 (Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2005/20050919-2005-P-00024.pdf [hereinafter OIG, 
Limited Knowledge] (“With the exception of the [Safe Drinking Water Act], we found [EPA’s] universe data for the 
sampled programs was not reliable.”). 
91 For citations to additional OIG and GAO reports substantiating data deficiencies that hampered performance of 
EPA’s enforcement functions, see Markell, Slack, supra note 14, at 31-32 nn.132-33. 
92 OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note 89, at 6.  This conclusion was based on an assessment of EPA’s state of 
knowledge of the scope of the regulated universe under the Clean Air Act (CAA), the Clean Water Act (CWA), the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).  Id. at 4.  Of these, the 
OIG found that EPA had reliable and current data only for sources regulated under the SDWA.  Id. at 8 (Table 2-2).  
For a description of the benefits of full knowledge of the regulated universe, see id. at 2; see also id. at 7 (“Without 
reliable universe information, OECA lacks both a definitive baseline on the number, size, and character of entities 
subject to regulation, as well as the information necessary to provide a denominator for compliance rates.”). 
93 EPA, Office of Inspector General, Response to Congressional Request on EPA Enforcement, Report No. 13-P-
0168, at 6 (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2013/20130228-13-P-0168.pdf.  
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data on these permits in a complete and centralized source of information, which limits the 
agency’s ability to assess the impact of NSR.”94  
 
Relatedly, agencies often lack needed information about the compliance status of even 
those facilities they know fall within the scope of regulatory programs.95  The GAO concluded in 
a 2012 report that “because of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in some programs, 
such as the NPDES, EPA cannot determine the full extent of entities’ compliance.”96  EPA itself 
has acknowledged as much.97  EPA’s ignorance of the compliance status of regulated entities 
appears to extend to a host of statutory programs.  For example, the OIG found that EPA lacks a 
systematic framework for identifying violations of the dredge and fill permit program under 
section 404 of the Clean Water Act.98  The OIG attributed this problem to “a limited field 
presence,” finding that “EPA identifies violations through a passive, reactive method of relying 
on complaints and referrals from external sources.  An incomplete national data system and 
sporadic coordination with federal and State partners further impair EPA’s ability to maintain an 
effective § 404 enforcement program.”99  The GAO found that data provided by states to EPA 
failed to provide reliable information on the frequency of community water systems’ violations 
of the SDWA’s national drinking water standards, and that “the data did not reliably reflect the 
frequency of monitoring violations, which are a predictor of health-based violations.”100  A third 
94 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Air Pollution: EPA Needs Better Information on New Source Review 
Permits, GAO-12-590, at 7 (June 2012), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-590; see also Casey Roberts, New 
York v. EPA: State Response to A Federal Regulatory Rollback, 33 ECOLOGY L.Q. 613, 652 (2006). 
95 See OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note 89, at 16 (“OECA could not determine or report on the levels of 
compliance with environmental regulations for five of our six sample regulatory areas.”).  The problem is 
longstanding.  See Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement in the Clean Water 
Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 32 (1997) (calling flawed or incomplete data systems or tracking methods “a 
severe problem that calls into question EPA’s ability and desire” to monitor compliance at the state level). 
96 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Environmental Protection: EPA Should Develop a Strategic Plan for Its 
New Compliance Initiative, GAO-13-115, at 2 (2012) [hereinafter GAO, Strategic Plan],  
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/650711.pdf; see also Joel A. Mintz, Scrutinizing Environmental Enforcement: A 
Comment on A Recent Discussion at the AALS, 17 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 127, 143 (2001) (concluding that 
“partial and incomplete data” hinder efforts to evaluate EPA’s enforcement success). 
97 See, e.g., Fraudulent Data, supra note 62, at 4 (“The EPA lacks a due diligence process for potential fraudulent 
environmental data.  Although the EPA has three instruments that address how to respond to instances of fraudulent 
data, each instrument is out of date or unimplemented.”). 
OECA has agreed with the OIG’s assessment, finding data deficiencies concerning important categories of 
sources subject to Clean Water Act regulation.  U.S. EPA, Office of Enforcement and Compliance, Clean Water Act 
Action Plan 4 (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/documents/actionplan101409.pdf 
[hereinafter EPA, CWAP].  OECA confessed that it lacked critical information on the compliance status of the 
biggest facilities, adding that “[i]f a facility isn’t reporting, we don’t know whether it is violating its permit limits.”  
Id. at 3.  In the face of these and other deficiencies, OECA promised to work with states to fill these gaps to help 
make informed decisions on how best to deploy limited enforcement resources.  Id. at 7. 
98 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012). 
99 EPA, Office of Inspector General, EPA Needs a Better Strategy to Identify Violations of Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act, Report No. 10-P-0009, at 6 (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2010/20091026-10-P-
0009.pdf; see also id. at 7.  EPA shares authority to enforce the dredge and fill permit program with the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers.  See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(n), (s) (2012). 
100 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Drinking Water: Unreliable State Data Limit EPA’s Ability to Target 
Enforcement Priorities and Communicate Water Systems’ Performance, GAO-11-381, at 13 (June 2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319780.pdf; see also id. at 17 (reporting that “the total number of monitoring 
violations is much higher than indicated by the SDWIS/Fed data, suggesting that the total number of health-based 
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example is the agency’s inability to effectively monitor high priority violations under the Clean 
Air Act, assess results, and make informed policy changes due to data deficiencies.101 
 
The GAO summarized this first challenge well several years ago.  It concluded that, 
notwithstanding EPA’s efforts to plug data gaps that hindered its own enforcement initiatives 
and its oversight of state enforcement, EPA “still needs comprehensive, accurate, and reliable 
data that would allow it to better target limited resources to those regions and potential pollution 
problems of the greatest concern.”102  It echoed this conclusion more recently, finding that 
“because of incomplete or unreliable data on compliance in some programs, such as the NPDES, 
EPA cannot determine the full extent of entities’ compliance.”103  
 
2. Significant Noncompliance 
 
A second challenge facing state and federal enforcement officials is the high incidence of 
noncompliance with regulatory obligations.  As two scholars of environmental policy noted in 
2014, “[s]ubstantial rates of non-compliance with traditional regulation have persisted even after 
decades of regulatory control.”104  The GAO found, for example, in a 2012 report that EPA data 
for 2010 showed that 45 percent of certain point sources subject to effluent limitations in NPDES 
permits reported violations.105  The OIG had concluded in an earlier report that EPA 
Headquarters failed to provide effective oversight of state enforcement under delegated 
environmental programs, resulting in sources subject to high priority Clean Air Act obligations 
remaining out of compliance “longer than they should, leaving the potential for excess pollutants 
to be emitted.”106  This, too, is a problem that has been documented for years.107   
violations is also larger than indicated”); GAO, Strategic Plan, supra, note 95, at 2 (“[U]nreliable data in EPA’s 
drinking water program limits EPA’s ability to identify violations.”). 
101 EPA, Office of Inspector General, EPA Oversight and Policy for High Priority Violations of Clean Air Act Need 
Improvement, Report No. 10-P-0007, at 7 (Oct. 14, 2009), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2010/20091014-10-P-
0007.pdf [hereinafter OIG, Priority].  Data deficiencies have hampered other environmental programs.  See, e.g., 
Vanessa Zboreak, “Yes, in Your Backyard!” Model Legislative Efforts to Prevent Communities from Excluding 
CAFOs, 5 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 147, 165 (2015) (enforcement of air quality standards against confined 
animal feedlot operations); Joanna Lau, Nothing but Unconditional Love for Conditional Registrations: The 
Conditional Registration Loophole in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 44 ENVTL. L. 1177, 
1195 (2014) (discussing EPA’s acknowledgment data-tracking for pesticide registrations is out of date and 
inaccurate).  Cf. Shannon M. Roesler, The Nature of the Environmental Right to Know, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 989, 1048 
(2012) (incomplete and inadequate information in the toxic release inventory). 
102 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Clean Water Act: Longstanding Issues Impact EPA’s and States’ 
Enforcement Efforts: Statement of Anu K. Mittal, Natural Resources and Environment Team, GAO-10-165T, at 14 
(Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/123559.pdf [hereinafter GAO, Mittal]; see also Mary L. Lyndon, 
Secrecy and Access in an Innovation Intensive Economy: Reordering Information Privileges in Environmental, 
Health, and Safety Law, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 465, 501 (2007) (“ ‘data gaps’ ” continue to undermine regulatory 
efforts”). 
103 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note 95, at 2.  
104 Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Performance Track’s Postmortem: Lessons from the Rise and Fall of EPA’s 
“Flagship” Voluntary Program, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 84 (2014). 
105 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note 95, at 1.  
106 OIG, Priority, supra note 100,  at 5.  
107 For example, the OIG concluded in 2000 that regional officials lacked reporting procedures to identify whole 
effluent toxicity (WET) violations by Clean Water Act permittees in North Carolina.  As a result, “the Region could 
not work with the State to improve water quality in those important areas.  U.S. EPA, Office of Inspector General, 
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 Moreover, too much of this noncompliance is significant.108  EPA itself has 
acknowledged the problem.  Former EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, for example, in a 
memorandum to the head of EPA’s enforcement program, noted that “[w]e are .  .  .   falling 
short of this Administration’s expectations for the effectiveness of our clean water 
enforcement program. . . .  Data available to EPA shows that, in many parts of the country, the 
level of significant non-compliance with permitting requirements is unacceptably high and the 
level of enforcement activity is unacceptably low.”109  Shortly thereafter, OECA issued a Clean 
Water Act Action Plan110 in which it characterized violations as “too widespread” and 
enforcement as “uneven.”111  OECA concluded that it needed to overhaul its enforcement 
approach to meet this set of challenges.112 
 
3. Shortcomings in State Enforcement 
 
The principal enforcers of the cooperative federalism environmental programs are the 
states, exercising authority delegated to them with EPA’s approval.113  Faced with the kind of 
significant noncompliance described above, at least some states have performed inadequately 
and EPA’s oversight of state enforcement has been problematic.114   In a report published in 
2011, EPA’s OIG described these failings in considerable detail.115  According to the OIG: 
 
state enforcement programs frequently do not meet national goals and states do not always take 
necessary enforcement actions.  State enforcement programs are underperforming:  EPA data 
indicate that noncompliance is high and the level of enforcement is low.  EPA does not 
consistently hold states accountable for meeting enforcement standards, has not set clear and 
consistent national benchmarks, and does not act effectively to curtail weak and inconsistent 
enforcement by states.116 
Audit Report: North Carolina NPDES Enforcement and EPA Region 4 Oversight, Report No. 2000-P-00025 (Sept. 
28, 2000), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/ncfile4.pdf.  
108 See James Salzman, J.B. Ruhl & Kai-Sheng Song, Regulatory Traffic Jams, 2 WYO. L. REV. 253, 253 (2002) 
(“Studies by the General Accounting Office have consistently found significant noncompliance with the Clean 
Water Act.”); Daniel A. Farber, Taking Slippage Seriously: Noncompliance and Creative Compliance in 
Environmental Law, 23 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 297, 304 (1999) (identifying high rates of significant noncompliance 
under the Clean Water Act). 
109 Press Release, U.S. EPA Administrator Jackson Takes Steps to Improve Water Quality (July 6, 2009), 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/0/ED67FE3CE2207400852575EB00681995. 
110 For discussion of the Plan, see Markell & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 64-75. 
111 EPA, CWAP, supra note 96, at Executive Summary. 
112 Id. at 5. 
113 See Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Inspector General, FY 2015EPA Management Challenges, 15-
N-0164, at 1 (May 28, 2015),  http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2015/20150528-15-N-0164.pdf [hereinafter OIG, 
Challenges](“The EPA relies heavily on authorized states to obtain environmental program performance data and 
implement compliance and enforcement programs.”).  
114 See Lesley K. McAllister, The Enforcement Challenge of Cap-and-Trade Regulation, 40 ENVTL. L. 1195, 1221-
22 (2010) (“Studies have suggested that the environmental enforcement conducted by many states in the past has 
been weak and inadequate.”). 
115 See GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note 95, at 2 (finding underperformance by state enforcement programs). 
116 EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA Must Improve Oversight of State Enforcement, Report No. 12-P-0113, at 
ii (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2012/20111209-12-P-0113.pdf; [hereinafter OIG, Improve]; see 
also id. (“[S]tate performance remains inconsistent across the country, providing unequal environmental benefits to 
the public and an unlevel playing field for regulated industries.”). 
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 Deficiencies in state enforcement performance, and in EPA’s oversight of state 
performance, ranged across the entire array of delegated programs.117  The OIG compared state 
performance with OECA’s national enforcement goals, finding that all but one EPA region 
included at least one state that performed in the bottom quartile in one or more programs, 
apparently indicating that the problem was widespread, not just concentrated in one state or 
region.118  EPA’s goal was that states inspect 100 percent of major Clean Air Act emitters every 
two years, but only eight states met that goal.119  EPA set a national goal that states enter 100 
percent of high-priority CAA violations into EPA data systems within sixty days, but only two 
states met that goal.120  Similar problems arose under the Clean Water Act.  Only one state met 
EPA’s 2006 goal of inspecting 100 percent of major point sources each year.121  The next year, 
EPA issued a new Compliance Monitoring Strategy that reduced the goal to inspection of 100 
percent of major sources every two years, beginning in 2009.  But the national average in 2010 
was only 61 percent.  Only two states met this inspection goal, while 13 states inspected fewer 
than 50 percent of major facilities.122  EPA set a goal under RCRA that state agencies inspect 
100 percent of large quantity waste generators every 5 years, but in 2010, states on average 
inspected only 62 percent of these facilities, and only two states met the 100 percent goal.123   
 
The OIG found that state performance varied widely across the country, by as much as 50 
percentage points for Clean Air Act enforcement.  “[S]ome states inspected facilities, identified 
violations, and/or assessed penalties for violations at a much higher rate than other states.”124  
Moreover, EPA did not consistently hold regions accountable for ensuring that states adequately 
enforce environmental laws, failing to set clear and consistent benchmarks for state 
performance,125 and to ensure that the regional offices followed national oversight guidance.126  
Among other things, even though OECA, regional, and state enforcement officials all agreed that 
states were underperforming, these failings precluded EPA’s national headquarters from 
“objectively know[ing] which states require immediate intervention,” and EPA regions “did not 
consistently intervene to correct deficient state performance.”127 
 
The OIG report represents a snapshot of federal and state enforcement failings at a 
particular point in time.  The OIG, however, has reported similar problems more recently.  It 
concluded in 2015, for example, that regional oversight of inspections of facilities regulated 
under FIFRA was plagued by inadequate guidance and training.  According to the OIG, 
“[i]mprovements are needed to increase assurance that pesticides are not misused and do not 
117 See, e.g., OIG, Challenges, supra, note 112, at 2-4 (describing deficiencies in state enforcement and in EPA 
oversight across a host of regulatory programs). 
118 OIG, Improve, supra note 115, at 8. 
119 Id. at 9. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 8. 
123 Id. at 10. 
124 Id. 
125 “Most of the performance requirements established in the laws and regulations are not easily measurable.  For 
example, the regulations require appropriate penalties, but do not define ‘appropriate.’”  Id. at 12. 
126 Id. at 11. 
127 Id. at 16. 
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pose unnecessary risks to human health and the environment.”128  Moreover, these examples are 
consistent with recurring concerns expressed by some.  One commentator, citing studies from the 
1990s and early 2000s, concluded that “states are not enforcing environmental laws as 
stringently as would the federal government—in effect, state agents are shirking their 
enforcement responsibilities.”129   
 
4. Linking Enforcement Choices to Environmental Conditions (Metrics) 
 
One final challenge that has long plagued agency enforcement officials is the difficulty of 
ascertaining what impact different enforcement choices would have on public health and 
environmental quality.  Environmental law has grappled with the difficulty of drawing cause-
and-effect linkages between particular activities, such as the activities of a polluter or group of 
polluters, and an environmental quality problem, such as ambient concentrations that exceed 
regulatory standards.  As Todd Aagaard describes, complex lines of causation are an important 
characteristic of environmental law, and one that creates considerable difficulties for 
environmental lawmaking.130 
 
Similar causal conundrums apply in the enforcement context.  Michael Vandenbergh has 
described the problem cogently: 
 
EPA recently has attempted to link reports of environmental performance to human health and 
environmental harms and to coordinate this effort with state enforcement agencies through a 
variety of initiatives.  Nevertheless, activity counts (e.g., the number of orders issued or cases 
filed) still dominate the data collection and reporting efforts.  The linkage between enforcement 
and human health and environmental quality is extremely difficult to make, and in most cases 
EPA has only been able to identify the amount of pollutants reduced by an enforcement action, 
not the corresponding effect on human health or the environment.  In addition, the tort liability 
implications of linking a specific release to human health or environmental harms may create 
strong incentives for firms to dispute government assertions of linkages.131 
 
Vandenbergh concluded that inadequate monitoring capacity hampers the ability of enforcement 
officials to link reductions in noncompliance rates or in pollutants emitted to changes in health 
128 EPA Office of Inspector General, EPA’s Oversight of State Pesticide Inspections Needs Improvement to Better 
Ensure Safeguards for Workers, Public and Environment Are Enforced, Report No. 15-P-0156, at 6 (May 15, 2015), 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2015/20150515-15-P-0156.pdf.  
129 Mark Atlas, Enforcement Principles and Environmental Agencies: Principal-Agent Relationships in A Delegated 
Environmental Program, 41 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 939, 941 (2007).  For book-length treatment of concerns about state 
enforcement and EPA oversight, see CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT AND THE FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONSHIP (ELI 2003). 
130 Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 
221, 270-71 (2010) (“[I]t is still unclear whether humans have the capacity to understand and plan over the scope 
required for effective environmental lawmaking.”); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental 
About Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 744-48 (2000) (describing attributes of 
ecological injury that make it difficult to establish cause and effect linkages); Richard J. Lazarus, Human Nature, the 
Laws of Nature, and the Nature of Environmental Law, 24 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 240 (2005) (arguing that scientific 
uncertainty will increase as “the laws of nature spread cause and effect out over time and space”). 
131 Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms in Corporate Environmental 
Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 91-92 (2003). 
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and environmental quality.132  Ultimately, Vandenbergh asserts, “[t]he allocation of enforcement 
resources to those environmental violations that cause the greatest harm to human health or the 
environment is obviously an important objective, but the added benefit of increasing compliance 
through the use of the information on the harms caused by noncompliance has received little 
attention.”133  
 
B. Emerging Enforcement Challenges 
 
 EPA and state agencies have grappled for years with the traditional challenges described 
above, which pose obstacles to effective enforcement of environmental laws.  This section 
describes a non-exhaustive array of notable additional challenges of more recent vintage, which 
exacerbate the difficulties created by the traditional challenges.  These include declining 
resources, increased responsibilities, differentiation of regulated entities’ duties, and a 
recognition that enforcement officials need to focus more attention on small sources. 
 
1. Declining Resources 
 
Effective enforcement requires sufficient resources to investigate potential regulatory 
violations and pursue enforcement actions against those responsible for committing them.  It is 
no secret that both EPA and the states in recent years have cut funding for environmental 
programs.  EPA’s funding has waxed and waned over the years.  Adjusting for inflation, EPA’s 
funding in fiscal year 2009 (7.2 billion)134 was slightly lower than in fiscal year 1978.135  
Between fiscal years 2000 and 2010, the agency’s budget rose in nominal terms from $7.8 billion 
to $10.4 billion, but remained relatively flat over this period in real terms.136  Adjusted for 
inflation, the 2014 funding level was still slightly below the level provided in fiscal year 1977.137  
Funding was cut by an additional $60 million for fiscal year 2015.138  Thus, the agency’s funding 
fell during a period in which, as described in the next section, its responsibilities increased 
significantly. 
 
132 Id. at 92. 
133 Id. at 93-94. 
134 EPA received $14.8 million in appropriated funds in fiscal year 2009, but about half took the form of emergency 
supplemental appropriations under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115.  ROBERT ESWORTHY ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42520, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
(EPA): APPROPRIATIONS FOR FY2013, at 2, 39, 41 (2012), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42520.pdf. 
[hereinafter ESWORTHY, FY2013]. 
135 Id. at 39.  
136 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Management Challenges and Budget Observations: Statement of David 
C. Trimble, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, GAO-12-149T, at 1 (Oct. 12, 2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/585707.pdf.  
137 ROBERT ESWORTHY & DAVID M. BEARDEN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (EPA): APPROPRIATIONS 
FOR FY2014 IN P.L. 113-76, at 28 (2014) (Figure A-1), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43689.pdf.  EPA’s 
website provides funding numbers that are even lower than those described above.  For example, EPA indicates its 
budget in 2013 was only $7.9 billion and only $8.1 billion in 2014.  See EPA’s Budget and Spending, 
http://www2.epa.gov/planandbudget/budget.  
138 Nancy Ognanovich, Obama Signs 2015 Spending Bill that Would Cut $60 Million from EPA, 45 ENV’T REP. 
(BNA) 3657 (Dec. 19, 2014). 
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Funding for EPA’s Environmental Programs and Management, which includes 
enforcement activities,139 also fell from $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $2.6 billion in fiscal 
year 2014.140  Inflation-adjusted funding for OECA specifically fell significantly between 1994 
(about $690 million) and 2000 (about $605 million) and then wavered slightly up or down 
between 2000 and 2013 ($620 million).141  OECA’s budget for fiscal year 2015 was almost nine 
percent lower than it was in 2010.142 
 
The real decline in EPA’s budget over the last decade or more has forced the agency to 
cut back on the size of its workforce.  EPA’s peak staffing occurred in fiscal year 1999, when it 
employed 18,110 people.  That number declined to 17,106 in 2012 and to 15,408 in 2014, a 
figure lower than any year since 1990.143  Staffing levels fell below 15,000 by early 2015.144  
These workforce reductions affected enforcement staffing.  EPA also reduced the size of the 
regional enforcement workforce, which is responsible for most of the agency’s enforcement 
activity, by about five percent between fiscal years 1997 and 2006 from 2,568 full-time 
equivalent (FTE) staff to 2,434 FTEs.  The OECA headquarters workforce declined one percent 
during this same period.145  
 
The decline in resources available to the federal government for environmental protection 
programs generally, and for enforcement functions specifically, impacts state enforcement under 
delegated programs.146  Shrinkage of the dollars flowing to EPA makes it more difficult for EPA 
to subsidize the operation of state programs.  Total state and tribal assistance grants fell from 
$4.9 billion in fiscal year 2010 to $3.5 billion in fiscal year 2014, a 29 percent decline.147    
Between fiscal years 2008 and 2014 annual appropriations for EPA categorical grants to assist 
139 ESWORTHY & BEARDEN, supra note 136, at 30.  Declines in resources from other sources, such as permitting fees, 
can indirectly affect the agency’s enforcement activities.  Shortfalls in fees generated by Clean Air Act permitting 
caused EPA to shift non-Title V revenue to fund Title V programs, making those funds unavailable for other 
purposes.  EPA Office of Inspector General, Enhanced EPA Oversight Needed to Address Risks from Declining 
Clean Air Act Title V Revenues, Report No. 15-P-0006, at 9 (Oct. 20, 2014), 
http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2014/20141020-15-P-0006.pdf.  EPA’s OIG, like those of other federal agencies, 
has experienced its own budget cuts, adversely affecting the capacity to oversee agency activities.  See KEARNEY & 
CO., ACCELERATING CHANGE: THE 2015 INSPECTOR GENERAL SURVEY 5, 9-10, 18 (Sept. 15), 
https://www.agacgfm.org/AGA/ResearchPublications/IG%20survey%20sept.%202015/AGA-IG-Survey-2015.pdf.  
140 ESWORTHY & BEARDEN, supra note 136, at 26.  The OIG reports that “[i]n fiscal years 2013 and 2014, the EPA 
directed almost one-tenth of its enacted annual budget to enforcing environmental laws and promoting compliance.  
This amounts to almost $1.5 billion in fiscal years 2013 and 2014 combined.”  OIG, Reduce Risk, supra note 67, at 
1. 
141 Jay P. Shimshack, The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement, 6 ANN. REV. RES. ECON. 339, 
344 (2014) (Figure 1); see also James Alm & Jay Shimshack, Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons 
from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings, 10 FOUND. & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 210, 217 (2014). 
142 Renee Schoof, Air Toxics, Hazardous Waste Top EPA Enforcement Priorities, 47 ENV’T REP. (BNA) S-62 (Jan. 
15, 2016). 
143 See EPA’s Budget and Spending, supra note 136. 
144 Robin Bravender, Workforce shrinks to level last seen in late 1980s, GREENWIRE, Mar. 2. 2015. 
145 GAO, Mittal, supra note 101, at 7-8. 
146 See, e.g., Will Reisinger, Trent A. Dougherty & Nolan Moser, Environmental Enforcement and the Limits of 
Cooperative Federalism: Will Courts Allow Citizen Suits to Pick up the Slack?, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1, 
21 (2010) (noting that state budget cuts and shortfalls threaten the effectiveness of cooperative federalism). 
147 ESWORTHY & BEARDEN, supra note 136, at 26-27. 
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states in implementing delegated programs shrunk by about $24 million.148  The Environmental 
Council of the States (ECOS) has expressed concern about reductions in federal funding for state 
environmental programs.149  It has concluded, for example, that “[i]nsufficient resources hinder 
adequate State field presence at water systems” covered by the SDWA, rendering the states 
“unable to adequately follow up on any significant deficiencies discovered during [so-called 
sanitary surveys] or to prepare the necessary enforcement orders.”150 
 
To make matters even more challenging, many states cut their own budgets for 
environmental agencies at the same time that federal funding for EPA programs and delegated 
state programs fell.  ECOS concluded in 2009 and 2010 that reductions in state budgets for 
environmental enforcement threatened the viability of state enforcement programs.151  Between 
fiscal years 2011 and 2012, 24 states reduced funding for their environmental agencies,152 
reflecting a trend of decreasing funding for state environmental agencies, which, according to 
ECOS, jeopardizes state implementation of federally delegated programs.153  The GAO 
emphasized the growing importance of federal grants in the face of state reductions in funding 
for environmental programs.154  Some states responded to reduced funding for environmental 
programs by reducing staff levels and cutting outreach and technical assistance programs that 
can facilitate compliance.155  State environmental officials have reported to the GAO that 
resource constraints have resulted in hiring freezes, staff attrition and layoffs, and, ultimately, the 
diminished capacity of the states to conduct permitting, inspections, and monitoring, all of which 
are critical to effective enforcement.156  
  
EPA has acknowledged the adverse impacts of declining resources, albeit in some cases 
by putting a positive gloss on the problem.  In an article describing its Next Generation 
Compliance initiative, Cynthia Giles, the Assistant Administrator for OECA, noted that “[e]ven 
in a time of declining budgets, we are developing more innovative approaches [such as Next 
Generation Compliance] to help us get better protection.”157   EPA was perhaps more forthright 
148Id. at 26 (2014); see also U.S. Government Accountability Office, Funding for 10 States’ Programs Supported by 
Environmental Protection Agency Categorical Grants, GAO-13-504R, at 4-5 (May 6, 2013), 
http://www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-504r [hereinafter GAO, Categorical]. 
149 See Markell & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 53-54 (citing ECOS, March 2008 Green Report: State 
Environmental Expenditures 2005-2008, March 12, 2008, http://www.ecos.org/section/states/spending).  ECOS is a 
non-profit organization working to improve the operation of state environmental agencies.  Environmental Council 
of the States, Organizational Structure and Bylaws 1 (March 18, 2015). 
150 The Environmental Council of the States, The State Environmental Agencies’ Statement of Need and Budget 
Proposal for EPA’s 2013 Categorical Grants STAG Budget (State and Tribal Assistance Grants) 21 (2011), 
http://www.ecos.org/files/4482_file_ECOS_Proposal_for_EPAs_2013_STAG_Budget.pdf. 
151 Markell & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 54. 
152 R. Steven Brown, Envtl. Council of the States, Status of State Environmental Agency Budgets, 2011-2013, at 1 
(Sept. 2012), http://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/41680992/September%202012%20Green%20Report.pdf.  The 24 
states with decreasing budgets experienced larger changes than the 25 states with increasing budgets, and the total 
decline in state environmental agency budgets from FY2011 to FY2012 averaged $357,015 per state.  Id. 
153 See id. at 2, 5.   
154 GAO, Categorical, supra note 147, at 1. 
155 Id. at 4, 9.  On the potential value of technical assistance and outreach by regulators, see Carol Foley & Michael 
Elliott, Systems Design and the Promotion of Pollution Prevention: Building More Effective Technical Assistance 
Programs, 29 GA. L. REV. 449 (1995). 
156 GAO, Categorical, supra note 147, at 4, 9-10.  
157 Giles, supra note 18, at 26. 
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in its 2014-2018 Strategic Plan, which describes Next Generation as “the right direction for the 
agency regardless of resources because it will increase effectiveness, and it becomes more urgent 
in a time of challenging budgets. . . .”158  Even more to the point, EPA officials told the GAO 
that it has become increasingly difficult to rely primarily on its traditional approach of inspecting 
individual entities to increase compliance with the nation’s environmental laws and 
regulations.159  They also told the agency’s OIG that, in terms of compliance monitoring 
strategy, EPA’s enforcement office has “sought to balance . . . the need to continue to maintain a 
credible enforcement presence. . . , the multi-year decline in resources . . . available for all 
enforcement activities, and the increasing complexity of matters covered by EPA’s settlement 
agreements.”160  As one prominent scholar of EPA enforcement noted even before the funding 
cuts of the last several years began, EPA “has suffered from a regulatory agenda and work load 
that far exceeds the size of its staff and available funding.”161  Scholars have made similar 
assessments about state enforcement capacity.162 
 
 One sign of the likely impact of declining resources on enforcement capacity is the 
anticipated number of enforcement activities EPA will initiate in the coming years.  Output 
measures are not a definitive measure of the impact of environmental enforcement.163  EPA has 
explained, for example, that its commitment to pursuing large, complex cases that will have the 
biggest environmental impact necessarily requires a reduction in the number of cases overall.  
According to the agency, this shift toward bigger but fewer cases will not reduce the protective 
impact of its enforcement activities.164  Nevertheless, the numbers provided in EPA’s latest five-
year strategic plan seem to presage a significant decline in enforcement activity.  EPA projects 
that over the period 2014-2018, it will conduct an average of 15,800 inspections and evaluations 
each year.165  During the period 2005-2009, that number was 21,000, so that the agency 
estimates a 25 percent decline over the period 2014-2018.166  The agency projected similar 
declines in other enforcement activities, including initiation of civil judicial and administrative 
enforcement cases (2800, as compared to 3900 during the baseline period, a 29 percent decline) 
and conclusions of civil judicial and administrative enforcement cases (2720, 3800; a 29 percent 
decline).167  
 
158 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, FISCAL YEAR 2014-2018 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN 39 (2014), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/epa_strategic_plan_fy14-18.pdf [hereinafter EPA, 
FY 2014-2018]. 
159 GAO, Strategic Plan, supra note 95, at 2. 
160 OIG, Reduce Risk, supra note 67, at 25. 
161 William L. Andreen, Federal Climate Change Legislation and Preemption, 3 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 
261, 298 (2008). 
162 See, e.g., Donald T. Hornstein, Complexity Theory, Adaptation, and Administrative Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 913, 956 
(2005) (referring to inadequate “budgetary and manpower capability [the states] felt were necessary to do their 
jobs”). 
163 See, e.g., Joel A. Mintz, Measuring Environmental Enforcement Success: The Elusive Search for Objectivity, 44 
ENVTL. L. REP. 10751, 10753 (2014) (discussing shortcomings of output measures). 
164 EPA, FY 2014-2018, supra note 157, at 38 (2014); see also EPA Budget in Brief, supra note 54, at 62 (noting the 
agency’s intention to allocate resources to noncompliance having the most significant impact, which will lead EPA 
to pursue higher impact, “large, complex cases that require significant investment and a long-term commitment”). 
165 EPA, FY 2014-2018, supra note 157, at 73. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. 
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In addition, EPA projects declines in the real world impacts of enforcement-related 
activities.  Over the five-year period covered by the latest plan, EPA expects to reduce, treat, or 
eliminate an average of 318 million estimated pounds of air pollutants each year as a result of 
concluded enforcement actions.  For the period 2005-2009, that number was 480 million pounds, 
33 percent more than for the period 2014-2018.168  The agency projects similar declines in 
pollution reduced for other media, including pounds of water pollutants reduced, treated, or 
eliminated (256 million, 320; 20 percent decline), pounds of hazardous waste treated, minimized, 
or properly disposed of (2920 million, 6500; 55 percent decline), commitments to clean up 
contaminated solid and groundwater media as a result of RCRA and CERCLA corrective action 
(205 million cubic yards, 300; 31 percent decline), and pounds of toxic and pesticide pollutants 
reduced, treated, or eliminated (2.8 million, 4.6, a 29 percent decline).169 
 
 In announcing EPA’s annual enforcement and compliance data for 2014, Assistant 
Administrator Giles referred again to the “challenges posed by budget cuts.”170  A former OECA 
Assistant Administrator remarked more bluntly in 2015 that “[t]he reduction in the enforcement 
budget and staff for [EPA] is impacting the ability to do enforcement actions. . . .”171  The trend 
lines, which appear to have been affected by resource declines, are hard to misunderstand.  The 
numbers for civil enforcement case initiations and conclusions and for federal inspections and 
evaluations, for example, are down in each case for virtually every year from 2009-2014.172    
 
The numbers for civil case initiations and conclusions rose slightly in fiscal year 2015 
(2380 as compared to 2268 initiations in 2014; 2360 as compared to 2275 for conclusions), but 
not enough to match 2013 figures and were still almost 1000 below 2011 figures (when the 
number for both initiations and conclusions was about 3300).173  The number of federal 
inspections and evaluations fell by 200 (to about 15,400) in 2015, which EPA again specifically 
attributed to budgetary cuts.174  In other respect, however, the numbers improved in 2015, 
including for administrative and civil judicial penalties assessed (which doubled from 2014 to 
2015 but still fell slightly below the figure for 2012) and the monetary value of supplemental 
environmental projects resulting from EPA enforcement actions (an increase from $17 million in 
2014 to $39 million in 2015, the highest figure since 2012).175 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 73-74.  We arrived at the average annual figures for the period 2014-2018 by dividing the cumulative 
numbers provided in EPA’s plan for the entire five-year period by five. 
170 She also attributed declining enforcement numbers in part to the government shutdown that occurred in 2014.  
Robin Bravender, Enforcement actions decline again; agency blames shutdown, budget woes, GREENWIRE, Dec. 18, 
2014.  Giles also referred again to the agency’s pursuit of large, high impact cases.  Id. 
171 46 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 1029 (April 3, 2015) (quoting Granta Nakayama).   
172 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, FISCAL YEAR 
2014 EPA ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ANNUAL RESULTS 8-9 (2014), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-12/documents/fy-2014-enforcement-annual-results-charts-12-08-
14.pdf#page=8.  
173 U.S. EPA, Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, Fiscal Year 2015, EPA Enforcement and 
Compliance: Annual Results 11 (Dec. 16, 2015), http://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-12/documents/fy-
2015-enforcement-annual-results-charts_0.pdf#page=3.  
174 Id. at 12.   
175 Id. at 4, 13.  The value of fines and restitution and court-ordered environmental projects in criminal cases also 
rose significantly in 2015, mostly due to a single criminal case involving Duke Energy.  Id. at 6.  Of the 
approximately $4 billion in court-ordered environmental projects, the Duke Energy case accounted for about $3.4 
billion.  Dep’t of Justice, Office of Public Affairs, Duke Energy Subsidiaries Plead Guilty and Sentenced to Pay 
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 2. Increased Regulatory Responsibilities 
 
 Another challenge to federal and state enforcement officials, which has exacerbated the 
adverse effects of declining budgets, has been an increase in the number of entities subject to 
environmental regulation and in EPA and state environmental responsibilities.176  Regulatory 
responsibilities expanded through much of the 1980s and early 1990s as a result of the enactment 
of new statutory programs (such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, 
and Liability Act in 1980177 and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act in 
1986178) and the dramatic expansion of existing regulatory programs, which drew many new 
sources within the scope of those programs—through amendments to RCRA in 1984,179 the 
CWA in 1987,180 and the CAA in 1990.181 
 
Recent changes in interpretation of the scope of the CWA and in EPA implementation 
strategies are illustrative.  EPA noted in 2015 that “[t]he NPDES permitted universe has grown 
and diversified over the last 25 years without comparable increases in resources.”182  The number 
of point sources subject to CWA permitting requirements doubled over a recent ten-year 
period.183  An appellate court decision established, for example, that pesticide applications that 
allow chemical residues to enter surface water bodies may trigger regulation under that statute, 
even if they did not do so previously.184 The court held that “it is clear that under the meaning of 
the Clean Water Act, pesticide residue or excess pesticide—even if treated as distinct from 
pesticide—is a pollutant discharged from a point source because the pollutant is ‘introduced into 
a water from the “outside world” by’ the pesticide applicator from a ‘point source.’ ”185  
Stormwater permitting has also increased the size of the regulated community.186  An increase in 
$102 Million for Clean Water Act Crimes (May 14, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/duke-energy-subsidiaries-
plead-guilty-and-sentenced-pay-102-million-clean-water-act-crimes. 
176 See, e.g., Bruce Harper, Trust but Verify: Innovation in Compliance Monitoring as a Response to the 
Privatization of Utilities in Developed Nations, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 593, 614 (1996) (“An increase in the number of 
generators alone holds some potential to make environmental enforcement more difficult.”); see also EPA Budget in 
Brief, supra note 54, at 62 (“The sheer number of regulated facilities, the contributions of large numbers of smaller 
sources, and limited resources means that EPA cannot rely on the traditional single facility inspection and 
enforcement approaches to ensure widespread compliance.”); Linda K. Breggin, Increasing Federal Outreach to 
States, 32 ENVTL F. 10 (referring to simultaneous increase in EPA responsibilities and dramatic resource decline). 
177 Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
178 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1729 (1986). 
179 Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3224 (1984). 
180 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 60 (1987). 
181 Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2468 (1990).  An OIG report found a 35% increase in the number of sources 
covered by six statutory programs between 2001 and 2005.  See OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note 89, at 7 (Table 
2-1). 
182 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF WATER, FY 2016-17 NATIONAL WATER PROGRAM 
GUIDANCE, EPA 420-R-15-008, at 48 (2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-04/documents/2016-
2017_nwpg_final.pdf.  EPA had referred to the “breadth and expanding scope of the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES) regulated universe” as one of the challenges it faces in improving its enforcement 
performance.  EPA, CWAP, supra note 96, at 10. 
183 Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 21-22 (2012). 
184 See National Cotton Council of Am. v. EPA, 553 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2009). 
185 Id. at 940. 
186 See, e.g., OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note 89, at 7 (identifying 45% increase in sources requiring CWA 
stormwater permits between 2001 and 2005); see also EPA, CWAP, supra note 96, at Executive Summary (“The 
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the number of regulated sources necessarily increases federal responsibilities as well as state 
responsibilities under delegated programs such as the NPDES permit program.  
 
The expanding universe of regulated activities can burden federal and state regulators.187  
Under the CWA, NPDES permits are for a fixed term that may not exceed five years.188  Over 
the years, EPA and state environmental agencies have developed a backlog in responding to 
requests to issue permits that should have expired, a problem to which declining resources and an 
expanded regulatory community likely contributed.  In one case, environmental groups sought a 
writ of mandamus requiring EPA to reissue permits issued to two steam electric power plants.  
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit denied the request, ruling that the groups failed to 
meet the requirements for mandamus relief, which is “a drastic remedy” reserved for 
“extraordinary situations.”189  The court acknowledged that “EPA’s delays in reissuing the 
NPDES permits are concerning and extensive,” but concluded that EPA was entitled to “balance 
competing priorities with its limited resources, . . . and . . . it has prioritized permits that have 
greater environmental impacts.”190  The court noted with approval EPA’s projection that it would 
get to the expired permits in another three years.191  This example is consistent with the findings 
reflected in a GAO report published in 2009, which found that “our work over the past 9 years 
has shown that the Clean Water Act has significantly increased EPA’s and the states’ 
enforcement responsibilities, available resources have not kept pace with these increased needs, 
and actions are needed to further strengthen the enforcement program.”192 
 
One way to reduce these kinds of burdens is the creation of general permits, such as the 
ones available under the CWA’s dredge and fill193 and NPDES194 permit programs.  Indeed, EPA 
has developed a general permit for pesticide and herbicide applications over surface waters.195  
Although general permits reduce the resource commitment a government agency must make at 
the permit approval stage, agencies still have ongoing responsibility to monitor, oversee 
regulated universe has expanded from the roughly 100,000 traditional point sources to nearly one million far more 
dispersed sources such as animal feeding operations and storm water runoff.”).  During the same period, the number 
of manufacturers covered by TSCA increased by 61%.  Id.  Likewise, discharges from expanding hydraulic 
fracturing activities may trigger CWA requirements.  See Robin Kundis Craig, Hydraulic Fracturing (Fracking), 
Federalism, and the Water-Energy Nexus, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 241, 249 (2013). 
187 See Kara Cook, Note, The Middle Ground of Pesticide Regulation: Why EPA Should Use a Watershed-Based 
Permitting Scheme in Its New Aquatic Pesticides Rule, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 451, 486 (2010) (noting “significant 
monitoring and enforcement challenges” due to “sudden explosion in permitting applicants”). 
188 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2012) (state permits); id. § 1342(a)(3) (EPA-issued permits). 
189 In re Sierra Club, 2013 WL 1955877, at *1 (1st Cir. 2013). 
190 Id. 
191 Id.; see also EPA Eyes Changing Benchmark for Measuring Outdated CWA Permits, ENVTL. POLICY ALERT, 
April 15, 2015, at 21, www.InsideEPA.com. 
192 GAO, Mittal, supra note 101, at 14; see also ESWORTHY, FY2013, supra note 133, at 39 (noting that funding for 
enforcement “had not kept pace with the increasing number of mandates and regulations, or with inflation”). 
193 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2012). 
194 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a); California Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., 728 F.3d 868 
(9th Cir. 2013) (involving California’s Industrial Activities Storm Water General Permit).  See generally Jeffrey M. 
Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 409, 413 
(2007). 
195 See, e.g., Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pesticide General Permit for Point 
Source Discharges From the Application of Pesticides, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (Nov. 7, 2011). 
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reporting, inspect, and enforce.196  If agencies accompany a switch from source-specific to 
general permitting with efforts to minimize oversight of sources covered by general permits such 
as through reduced inspections or enforcement, the result is likely to be a decline in verifiability 
and accountability and, most likely, compliance.197  
 
3. Differential Treatment of Regulated Entities 
 
A third enforcement challenge of increasing significance involves changes in the nature 
of regulatory approaches.  One reason for shifting regulatory strategies is the failure of the first 
generation of approaches to solve environmental problems.  For example, although the 
technology-based approach to controlling water pollution discharges resulted in significant 
reductions in water pollution levels, many water bodies remained too polluted to support desired 
used such as fishing or swimming.  As a result, EPA has expanded its focus in implementing the 
CWA to include not only enforcement of technology-based effluent limitations applicable to 
point sources, but also to achieving state water quality standards through the implementation of 
ambient quality-based effluent limitations.198   
 
One of the problems with this shift, however, is that it reintroduces some of the difficult 
causation problems that Congress sought to minimize when it adopted the Clean Water Act in 
1972.199  Implementation of water quality standards in waters with ambient concentrations above 
those allowed by the standards requires a state environmental agency to establish, and allocate 
among sources of pollution, a total maximum daily load (TMDL), which is an aggregate amount 
of pollution that may be discharged into a surface water body without resulting in concentrations 
of regulated pollutants in excess of those allowed by a state water quality standard.200  
196 See, e.g., 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,775 (listing among Pesticide General Permit requirements the duties of applicators to 
monitor adverse incidents and document visual monitoring activities).  General NPDES permits may regulate one or 
more discharge categories, provided all sources within a category are subject to the same or similar monitoring 
requirements.  40 C.F.R. § 122.28(a)(2)(ii)(D). 
197 The literature on compliance is unsettled on many issues, but there is considerable support for the notion that, 
other things being equal, lack of monitoring and sanctions is likely to reduce compliance.  Jodi Short & Michael W. 
Toffel, Making Self-Regulation More Than Merely Symbolic: The Critical Role of the Legal Environment, 55 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 361, 388 (2010); cf. Alm & Shimshack, supra note 140, at 210 (noting that “the overall effectiveness 
and cost-effectiveness of environmental monitoring and enforcement are controversial and incompletely 
understood”). 
198 See, e.g., GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 673 (noting increase in the role of water quality standards); Oliver 
A. Houck, The Clean Water Act Returns (Again): Part I, TMDLs and the Chesapeake Bay, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10208 
(2011); Robert W. Adler, Resilience, Restoration, and Sustainability: Revisiting the Fundamental Principles of the 
Clean Water Act, 32 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 139, 151 (2010) (“The current CWA focus on maintenance is reflected 
most clearly in the water quality standards provisions.”). 
199 For discussion of the impact that the difficulty of proving cause-and-effect relationships between discharges and 
ambient water quality had on implementation of the 1948 federal water pollution control legislation, and how 
Congress sought to avoid the need to demonstrate such relationships in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control 
Act Amendments, see Glicksman & Batzel, supra note 33, at 119-21. 
200 Upper Blackstone Water Pollution Abatement Dist. v. EPA, 690 F.3d 9, 14 n.8 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1313(d)(1)(C)).  The focus on enforcement of TMDLs is largely the result of citizen suits resulting in court 
decrees requiring the establishment of delinquent TMDLs.  See Oliver A. Houck, Cooperative Federalism, 
Nutrients, and the Clean Water Act: Three Cases Revisited, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10426, 10429 (2014) (stating that the 
“TMDL program lay dormant for a decade and a half until awakened by EPA intervention (stimulated in turn by 
environmental citizen suits”).  This example illustrates the need for policymakers engaged in regulatory design to 
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Establishing the TMDL, allocating allowable discharge amounts, monitoring whether allowed 
loadings (clearly enforceable or less so) are producing desired environmental results, and 
adapting to the findings are all resource-intensive enterprises, perhaps especially if the target is a 
vague narrative standard rather than a numerical target.201  Determining whether a point source 
violated technology-based effluent limits, which are often expressed as caps on end-of-pipe 
discharges, is a relatively simple matter by comparison.  Agency efforts to improve water quality 
by restoring and maintaining ecologically functioning ecosystems will likely create similar ripple 
effects on enforcement strategies.202  Expansion of the CWA permit program to cover 
stormwater permitting may make regulators’ enforcement tasks more difficult because regulation 
of stormwater discharges often takes the form of best management practices rather than end-of-
pipe discharge limits.203  It may be harder to track compliance status with mandates that take the 
form of ongoing operating practices than it is for numerical discharge limits that can be 
monitored.204  As regulatory challenges change, so do enforcement challenges. 
 
Another change in regulatory approach that is likely to create new enforcement 
challenges is the shift from traditional regulatory techniques such as technology-based limits that 
apply to classes of regulated sources to strategies that tailor regulatory duties to the 
circumstances of individual regulated entities, including the use of inter-source transactions to 
shift responsibilities among regulated entities.205  In the early years of the pollution control 
statutes, EPA asserted its authority to establish the responsibilities of regulated entities through 
the issuance of nationally applicable regulations that would impose uniform requirements for 
categories of sources, such as polluting facilities in the same industry.206  One of the reasons for 
taking this approach was EPA’s recognition that it could implement statutory programs such as 
the CWA’s effluent limitation program much more quickly if it could tackle entire categories of 
sources with one fell swoop rather than having to establish such requirements on a source-by-
source basis.207  Over the years, many critics of this approach argued that it resulted in inefficient 
consider how one aspect of a regulatory program (such as the availability of citizen enforcement) may affect other 
such aspects (such as the task of regulators to translate TMDLs into source-specific effluent limitations). 
201 The regulatory and non-regulatory enterprise of seeking to bring an impaired water up to a desired state is 
complex.  Cf. Sarah Birkeland, EPA’s TMDL Program, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 297, 300 (2001) (referring to “the 
implementation and enforcement challenges faced by the EPA’s TMDL program”). 
202 GLICKSMAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 606 (describing new objectives geared toward restoration and maintenance 
of functioning ecosystems and toward control of nonpoint source pollution). 
203 See, e.g., Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1338 (2013). 
204 See Robert L. Fischman & Jeffrey B. Hyman, The Legal Challenge of Protecting Animal Migrations as 
Phenomena of Abundance, 28 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 173, 223 (2010) (“BMPs are harder to monitor and enforce than 
traditional technology-based limitations because the BMPs are more widely dispersed across the landscape.”). 
205 U.S. environmental law has long been criticized for reliance on traditional regulatory approaches that fail to 
recognize differences among sources in the costs of controlling pollution.  See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Richard 
Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).  Policymakers have responded by 
incorporating market-based mechanisms such as tradeable permits into statutes such as the CAA.  See, e.g., 42 
U.S.C. § 7651b(b) (2012) (acid rain allowance trading programs). 
206 See, e.g., E.I du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (holding that EPA may issue effluent 
limitation regulations applicable to categories of industrial point sources under the CWA). 
207 See William Funk, The Exception that Approves the Rule: FDF Variances Under the Clean Water Act, 13 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1985) (“Of course, industry was well aware that bifurcating the effluent limitation 
decision, by requiring guidelines initially, would substantially delay the date any limitation would become 
enforceable.”). 
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regulation because, for instance, it required equal levels of control for sources with different 
impacts on the ambient environment.208 
 
In time, EPA responded by moving toward a more source-specific focus and toward 
greater reliance on market-based mechanisms such as emissions trading that have the potential to 
increase the efficiency of pollution reductions.  Cynthia Giles remarked in describing EPA’s 
Next Generation Compliance program that “market strategies that set standards but allow 
companies to decide how best to get there can be simple and effective in the right circumstances, 
reducing costs and providing flexibility for industry while achieving better results.”209  She cited 
as a successful example of market-based programs the acid rain control program adopted in the 
1990 Clean Air Act amendments. 
 
The adoption of a market-based approach does not necessarily require the adopting 
agency to craft different requirements for each individual discharger.  An agency, for example, 
could rely on a technology-based approach in imposing initial uniform obligations on all sources 
within a particular industry and allocate tradeable allowances based on those obligations.  If the 
agency authorized emission trading, sources would be free to overcomply and sell allowances or 
undercomply and buy allowances, creating a regime in which emission caps vary from 
discharger to discharger.  Such an approach, however, may impose burdens on the agency at the 
enforcement stage, as it would need to ascertain the nature and extent of enforceable duties of 
individual regulated entities based on their participation (or lack of participation) in the trading 
regime.210  In addition, some emissions trading markets have been exploited through the sale of 
credits for environmental improvements that would have occurred even without regulation, 
credits for which sellers have already been fully paid either in the same or another market, or 
credits that did not occur at all except on paper.211  Colorado noted that the burden on agencies to 
improve compliance may increase when requirements are tailored rather than consistent across 
an industry, not only because it will be more difficult for government inspectors to determine 
compliance, but also because “it may be more difficult to implement a self-certification program 
where individualized permits determine unique facility-specific compliance requirements.”212 
 
208 See, e.g., Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 204, at 1335 (arguing that uniform technology-based requirements 
waste money by ignoring variations among in the cost of reducing pollution , and that a more cost-effective strategy 
of could free resources for other purposes) 
209 Giles, supra note 18, at 24. 
210 See, e.g., Dennis D. Hirsch, Protecting the Inner Environment: What Privacy Regulation Can Learn from 
Environmental Law, 41 GA. L. REV. 1, 39 (2006) (“[I]t is easier to keep track of a uniform technology than to police 
facility-specific pollution reduction strategies. . . .   [S]trategies [that] encourage differentiation . . . offer less in the 
way of strict accountability and enforceability and open the door to bad-faith attempts to game the system.”). 
211 See Philip Womble & Martin Doyle, The Geography of Trading Ecosystem Services: A Case Study of Wetland 
and Stream Compensatory Mitigation Markets, 36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 229, 291-92 (2012).  For descriptions of 
exploitations of environmental regulatory markets, see Robert L. Glicksman, Regulatory Safeguards for 
Accountable Ecosystem Service Markets in Wetlands Development, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 943 (2014); Richard 
Toshiyuki Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air 
Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 231 (1999); see also Nicklas A. Akers, New Tools for Environmental 
Justice: Articulating a Net Health Effects Challenge to Emissions Trading Markets, 7 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y 203 (2001). 
212 Joe Schieffelin et al., Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, Colorado’s Hazardous Waste Small Quantity 
Generator (SQG) Self-Certification Program 18 (2013), 
https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/sites/default/files/HM_hw-sqg-self-certification-report_0.pdf.  
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4. The Need to Address Small Sources 
 
A final enforcement challenge is the effort to identify significant environmental threats 
from sources that are emitting or discharging relatively small amounts, but whose violations may 
be cumulatively significant.  As indicated above, programs like the NPDES permit program 
under the CWA have recently begun to account more closely for numerous small sources.213  
Small sources have not typically been the focus of agency enforcement attention.214  As EPA’s 
OIG has reported, “OECA concentrates most of its compliance monitoring and enforcement 
activities on large entities, and knows little about the identities or cumulative pollution effects of 
small entities.”215  In particular, at least as of 2005, OECA had failed to analyze the cumulative 
impact of entities emitting pollution below the threshold of major or large sources.216  Yet, some 
data show significant noncompliance rates among such sources.217  EPA has acknowledged the 
problem and seems determined to address it.218  One recent step has been the agency’s 2015 
electronic reporting rule,219 which requires state-authorized NPDES programs to share program 
data with EPA for nonmajor facilities, and is intended to “improve the ability of existing state 
and federal programs to target the most serious water quality and compliance problems. . . .”220  
If enforcement initiatives target small sources, enforcers may have to initiate more actions and 
commit more resources to enforcement just to achieve the same level of environmental 
improvement through enhanced compliance.221  In addition, data relevant to compliance status 
may not be available to the same extent for small as for larger sources,222 making it more 
difficult to enforce against those sources, or at least more expensive as agencies must amass a 
data base that does not exist or is incomplete.223 
 
213 See supra note 175. 
214 Cf. OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note 89, at 14 (reporting that, in multiple program areas, “OECA does not 
know the cumulative effects of pollution from small entities”).  The OIG also reported that small quantity hazardous 
waste generator inspections may be “some of the most environmentally significant activities that regions and States 
conduct.”  Id. 
215 Id. at 6; see also id. at 14 (“In most program areas in our sample, OECA does not know the cumulative 
effects of pollution from small entities.”). 
216  Id. at 11. 
217 EPA, CWAP, supra note 96, at 3 (“28 states (and 4 territories and the District of Columbia) . . . show a rate of 
serious noncompliance at these facilities of around 45 percent; states report taking enforcement action against less 
than six percent of these facilities with a serious noncompliance problem.”); see also Environmental Protection 
Agency, OIG, Limited Knowledge¸ supra note 89, at 11 (concluding that it is important to know the cumulative 
impact of small entities to “help OECA better prioritize where to focus resources and facilitate effective 
management”). 
218 EPA, CWAP, supra note 96, at 3 (“EPA and states need consistent, national data to be able to formulate 
appropriate strategies for ensuring compliance from [small] facilities, and to target enforcement resources to the 
sources most affecting water quality.”). 
219 Electronic Reporting Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,064 (Oct. 22, 2015). 
220 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,065, 64,079-64,081 (reporting that new rule would increase number of permit holders on 
which states had to provide data to EPA from approximately 46,000 to 400,000 entities).  
221 Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Environmental Lawyering in the Age of Collaboration, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 555, 560 
(“The remaining non-compliance cases often involve either smaller targets or more difficult problems of proof, 
making them costlier and riskier to litigate.”). 
222 EPA, CWAP, supra note 96, at 3 (noting that due to absence of discharge monitoring reports, EPA lacked a 
national rate for significant noncompliance for smaller facilities). 
223 See, e.g., OIG, Limited Knowledge, supra note 89, at 8 (discussing absence of reliable data on programs such as 
CAA regulation of minor stationary sources and regulation of small quantity generators under RCRA). 
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IV. EPA’s Next Gen Framework  
 
 As summarized above, EPA’s efforts have been subject to very substantial criticisms, 
including pointed criticism by its own leaders,224 covering the gamut of enforcement and 
compliance promotion activity since the agency’s creation more than 50 years ago.225  The 
agency has experimented over the years with ways to re-orient and upgrade its compliance 
efforts and those of its state partners.226  Some of these efforts have encountered strong resistance 
even from within EPA, a manifestation of the complexity of large organizations such as EPA.227  
Several, including some of the most publicized, have not survived or have not achieved hoped 
for objectives.228   
 
EPA’s recent launching of another experiment in enforcement governance, known as 
Next Generation Compliance, was motivated by the agency’s view that, because of 
contemporary challenges, “[e]nvironmental compliance today requires a change just as dramatic 
as the one Bill Ruckelshaus [EPA’s first Administrator] led over 40 years ago.”229  Next 
224 See, e.g., Press Release, supra note 108; supra notes 90-100, 106-11 and accompanying text.     
225 See supra Part II.  We are not suggesting that EPA does not frequently offer high praise for its enforcement 
efforts, which it has done regularly over the years as well.   
226 For book length treatments, see, e.g., RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra note 128; JOEL A. MINTZ, 
ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 161 (Univ. of Texas Press 2012) (revised edition); 
see also U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS THROUGH SMART ENFORCEMENT, FY 2002 
ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE ACCOMPLISHMENTS REPORT 5 (2003), 
http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPDF.cgi/500005AN.PDF?Dockey=500005AN.PDF (discussing EPA’s “Smart 
Enforcement” initiative, which aimed to make enforcement more efficient and maximize environmental benefits);  
Joel A. Mintz, “Treading Water”: A Preliminary Assessment of EPA Enforcement During the Bush II 
Administration, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10933 (Oct. 2004).   
227 Granta Y. Nakayama, New Paradigms for Enforcement: A Walk Down Memory Lane, 2014 ABA SEC. OF ENV’T, 
ENERGY, & RESOURCES 5 (Mar. 2014), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/environment_energy_resources/2014/03/43rd-spring-
conference/conference_materials_portal/15-nakayama_grant-paper.authcheckdam.pdf. (noting that, “[w]hile it 
would seem hard to argue with the general goals of Smart Enforcement, this effort nonetheless has met with 
resistance from other parts of the Agency”); MINTZ, supra note 224, at 161. 
228 Granta Y. Nakayama, supra note 226, at 5 (summarizing EPA’s “Smart Enforcement” reform initiative early in 
the 21st century and the obstacles such reforms faced); Jonathan H. Adler, Dynamic Environmentalism & Adaptive 
Management: Legal Obstacles and Opportunities J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 133, 149 (2015) (discussing Clinton 
Administration’s short-lived efforts to facilitate state-level experimentation); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO INNOVATIVE STATE REGULATORY PROGRAMS 
3 (2002), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02268.pdf (finding that states faced “cultural resistance” from EPA 
officials, largely in the form of time- and resource-consuming reviews, when they sought to innovate); Thomas E. 
Caballero, Project XL: Making It Legal, Making It Work, 217 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 390, 401 (1998) (noting absence of 
significant results from Project XL, “despite apparent industry enthusiasm for regulatory flexibility); Joyce M. 
Martin & Kristina Kern, The Seesaw of Environmental Power from EPA to the States: National Environmental 
Performance Plans, 9 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23-26 (1998) (stressing statutory and regulatory obstacles to innovation 
under the National Environmental Performance System); Barry Rabe, Environmental Policy and the Bush Era: The 
Collision Between the Administrative Presidency and State Experimentation, 37 PUBLIUS 413 (2007) (concluding 
that the Bush Administration had little interest in fostering state experimentation). 
229 Giles, supra note 18, at 22.  As suggested in Part IIIB.1 above, “[b]udget uncertainties and constrained resources 
only reinforce the imperative to move forward with Next Generation Compliance.”  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION 
AGENCY, NEXT GENERATION COMPLIANCE: STRATEGIC PLAN 2014-2017, 3-7 (2014), 
http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2014-09/documents/next-gen-compliance-strategic-plan-2014-2017.pdf 
[hereinafter EPA, NGC 2014-2017]. 
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Generation Compliance is intended to produce that dramatic transformation and provide a “new 
paradigm” for enforcement.230  This part reviews the premises underlying Next Gen and the key 
elements of the initiative as EPA has described them as a foundation for the next part’s 
evaluation of how our framework for regulatory design may enhance agency efforts to respond to 
regulatory dynamism through initiatives such as Next Gen.231  
 
A.  EPA’s Key Premises in Launching “Next Generation Compliance”  
 
EPA’s Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, Cynthia Giles, announced the agency’s 
launching of its Next Generation Compliance program in 2013.232  Giles suggested that the new 
initiative was intended to transform EPA’s enforcement efforts.233  Giles pointed out that the 
agency faced significant challenges and, while “tough enforcement” would remain an “essential 
part of our enforcement work. . . , [w]e can accomplish even more by moving our compliance 
programs into the 21st century.”234  This new approach would take advantage of new monitoring 
and information technology and “us[e] what we have learned about compliance to make it easier 
to comply than to violate.”235  
 
230 EPA, NGC 2014-2017, supra note 228.  Not everyone perceives Next Gen as the transformative effort being 
touted by EPA.  One commentator has suggested, for example, that 
Next Generation Compliance goals, many of which rely on technological advances, have not been 
perceived as a paradigm shift by the regulated community. . .  The primary innovation is to improve its data 
collection and management systems and make that data more readily available to the public.  This is not a 
paradigm shift to a new approach to environmental enforcement.  It is simply an acknowledgement that 
EPA can do its job better and more efficiently by modernizing its data collection and management 
functions. 
Nakayama, supra note 226, at 5-6.  See also Zacaroli, supra note 66. 
231 We explore the details of the Next Gen initiative, and EPA’s progress to date in implementing it, more 
thoroughly in our second article on regulatory design in the face of dynamic governance challenges.  See Markell & 
Glicksman, supra note 7. 
232 Giles, supra note 18.  For more on the history that led to the launching of Next Gen, see, e.g., EPA, STRATEGIC 
PLAN 2014-2017, supra note 228, at 3-7 (noting that it “builds on several innovative efforts like the Clean Water Act 
Action Plan”); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT & COMPLIANCE ASSURANCE, OECA 
NATIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER GUIDANCE FY 2014, at 2 (2013), 
http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyPURL.cgi?Dockey=P100H18X.txt (“OECA is investing in a new paradigm called Next 
Generation Compliance (Next Gen) to improve compliance and reduce pollution.”); GAO, Strategic Plan, supra 
note 95, at 2-4 (stating that Next Gen “remains in the early stages of development” and referencing background 
documents on its creation); Cynthia Giles, Next Generation Compliance, 45 ENVTL. L. REP. 10205 (2015) (also 
reviewing Next Gen) [hereinafter Giles, ELR]. 
233 Giles, supra note 18, at 26. 
234 Id. at 22.  EPA put it as follows: 
The health and environmental benefits envisioned by our statutes, regulations, and state and tribal programs 
are not being fully achieved.  Although the available data is incomplete, high noncompliance is evident in 
much of the data we do have.  State and federal resources for onsite compliance assistance, individual 
inspections, and enforcement actions are not adequate to address the large universe of regulated sources, 
especially the numerous small sources that are important contributors to environmental problems. . . .  Field 
operations and EPA regulations must consider emerging approaches and technology to be effective and 
efficient.  Together with the program offices, regions, and states, OECA is developing and will implement 
a new paradigm called Next Generation Compliance, which takes advantage of advances in emissions 
monitoring and information technology. 
OECA 2014, supra note 231, at 10.  
235 Giles, supra note 18, at 22.   
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B.  Key Elements of Next Generation Compliance  
 
EPA’s conceived of its Next Gen strategy as constituting five, inter-related key elements, 
as illustrated in Figure 2.236  As is apparent from the discussion below, EPA’s conceptual 
framework reflects its determination that effective compliance promotion requires much more 
than the traditional enforcement work of identifying significant violations followed by timely 
and appropriate enforcement response.    
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
1.  Regulation and Permit Design (“Rules with Compliance Built In”)237  
 
The notion of “rules with compliance built in” reflects EPA’s recognition that the nature 
and content of regulatory requirements affect compliance.238  Rules that establish clear 
expectations, for example, are more likely to be complied with than rules that are unclear.239  
One approach is to design regulations that “regulate upstream” by selecting a point in the supply 
chain where there are a smaller number of producers, rather than large numbers of users or 
236 This figure is EPA’s.  See U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Next Generation Compliance, 
http://www2.epa.gov/compliance/next-generation-compliance [hereinafter EPA, NGC].   
237 In some publications, EPA uses Regulation and Permit Design to capture this first element; in others it uses 
“Rules with Compliance Built in.”  Compare EPA, NGC, supra note 235, with Giles, supra note 18, at 22. 
238 EPA is in good company in recognizing that rule clarity makes compliance more likely.  See, e.g., Int’l Network 
for Envtl. Compliance & Enforcement, Creating Environmental Laws and Requirements that are Enforceable 
(1992), http://www.inece.org/princips/ch3.pdf. 
239 Giles, supra note 18, at 24 (“One of the principles we have learned over the years of hard experience is that 
compliance is better when the rules are simple and clear.”); see also Nakayama, supra note 226, at 5 (arguing that 
“[c]lear and easily understood rules . . . will inevitably result in higher compliance rates.  Rules for which a 
regulated party’s compliance status can be easily determined by the regulatory agency also achieve higher 
compliance rates.  Agency personnel . . . can focus on the easily identified entities that are not in compliance.”). 
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consumers.240  The smaller the size of the regulated universe, the easier it will be for federal and 
state regulators to communicate regulatory responsibilities and oversee compliance.  A smaller 
regulatory cohort also may have better capacity to comply than a larger, dispersed regulatory 
community.  As an example, Administrator Giles points to a regulation that places responsibility 
on the auto manufacturers for installation of air emissions control equipment and certification 
that cars meet required emissions control standards, not on individual car owners. 241   
 
2.  Advanced Monitoring 
 
 A second element of Next Gen is promotion of advanced monitoring.242  Monitoring 
compliance with environmental requirements is a foundational feature of effective 
governance.243   Despite the importance of the monitoring function, assessments over the years 
have highlighted critical deficiencies.244  Recent reviews across multiple EPA programs suggest 
that monitoring deficiencies continue to pose significant challenges to effective enforcement.245   
240 Email from David Hindin, EPA Senior Policy Director for Innovation & Next Generation Compliance, to David 
L. Markell, Steven M. Goldstein Professor of Law, Fla. St. U. Coll. of Law (July 20, 2015) (on file with author). 
241 Giles, supra note 18, at 23.  As Giles notes, second order compliance challenges  include ensuring that sources 
are operating their pollution control equipment properly.  Id.  She points to rules that provide for third–person 
compliance certifications and public disclosure of compliance information as other ways to write rules that will 
promote compliance.  Id.   See also Vandenbergh, supra note 82, at 148-51 (discussing third-party certification 
systems in forestry and aquaculture).   Upstream approaches do not always operate to eliminate compliance issues.  
See William Funk, Regulation by Litigation: Not so Bad, Regulation & Governance, 5 REG. & GOVERNANCE 275, 
276 (2011) (noting that large makers of diesel engines for semi trucks were caught using a computer defeat 
mechanism that shut off pollution controls when on the road but not during emissions testing).  Volkswagen was 
caught, and admitted to using, similar software.  See Coral Davenport & Jack Ewing, VW Is Said to Cheat on Diesel 
Emissions; U.S. to Order Big Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2015, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/19/business/volkswagen-is-ordered-to-recall-nearly-500000-vehicles-over-
emissions-software.html. 
242 Giles, supra note 18, at 24.  For a recent assessment, see Ralph Smith, Detect Them Before They Get Away: 
Fenceline Monitoring’s Potential to Improve Fugitive Emissions Management, 28 TUL. ENVTL L.J. 433 (2015). 
243 Monitoring is critical not only to assess and promote compliance, but also more generally to provide insights into 
the adequacy of the underlying regulatory regime and detect gaps in regulatory coverage.  See, e.g., Eric Biber, The 
Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (2011) (arguing that monitoring can serve as 
“a ‘meta’ tool that helps us choose whether and how to regulate.  Within any regulatory program, monitoring can 
help determine whether regulatory standards should be strengthened or relaxed for known harms.”). 
244  Monitoring methods for stack emissions (which are air pollutant emissions from stationary sources, such as 
industrial stacks) have advanced considerably in recent years and are relatively mature.  Monitoring methods for 
“fugitive emissions,” which EPA has referred to as “uncontrolled process emissions,” are much less well 
understood.   See U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FIN. OFFICER, TECHNOLOGY MARKET 
SUMMIT: CASE STUDY PRIMER FOR PARTICIPANT DISCUSSION: FENCELINE AIR QUALITY MONITORING (2012), 
http://nepis.epa.gov/Exe/ZyNET.exe/P100EDIT.TXT?ZyActionD=ZyDocument&Client=EPA&Index=2011+Thru+
2015&Docs=&Query=&Time=&EndTime=&SearchMethod=1&TocRestrict=n&Toc=&TocEntry=&QField=&QFi
eldYear=&QFieldMonth=&QFieldDay=&IntQFieldOp=0&ExtQFieldOp=0&XmlQuery=&File=D%3A%5Czyfiles
%5CIndex%20Data%5C11thru15%5CTxt%5C00000004%5CP100EDIT.txt&User=ANONYMOUS&Password=an
onymous&SortMethod=h%7C-
&MaximumDocuments=1&FuzzyDegree=0&ImageQuality=r75g8/r75g8/x150y150g16/i425&Display=p%7Cf&De
fSeekPage=x&SearchBack=ZyActionL&Back=ZyActionS&BackDesc=Results%20page&MaximumPages=1&ZyE
ntry=1&SeekPage=x&ZyPURL [hereinafter EPA, FENCELINE PRIMER]. 
245 See U.S. Government Accountability Office, Grants Management: EPA Has Opportunities to Improve Planning 
and Compliance Monitoring, GAO-15-618 (Aug. 2015), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-15-618 (discussing the 
need to explain how grants compliance monitoring relates to enforcement); OIG, Reduce Risk, supra note 139;  U.S. 
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 EPA’s goal through Next Gen is to enhance advanced monitoring, as well as electronic 
reporting and transparency (discussed below), through research and development and other 
efforts.246  Significant aims include enabling sampling in areas where it does not occur now (e.g., 
at facility fence-lines)247 and development of reliable monitoring technology that is widely 
accessible at low cost so that citizens as well as government officials and regulated parties can 
participate in monitoring.  The three goals outlined in EPA’s Draft Roadmap for Next-
Generation Air Monitoring, published in 2013, embody this agenda:  
 Promote development of affordable near-source fence-line monitoring technologies and sensor 
network-based leak detection systems . . . ;  
 Supplement air quality monitoring networks through development of low-cost, reliable air quality 
monitoring technology. . . ; and 
 Support environmental justice communities and citizen efforts to measure air pollution in local 
areas.248  
 
Additional, more accurate, and more timely data has the potential to dramatically enhance 
governments’ capacity to uncover pollution and violations on a real-time basis.  Giles suggests 
that advances in monitoring capacity are “contributing to a revolution in how we find and fix 
pollution problems.”249  An example is the use of cell phone technology.  As Giles has explained, 
“in one much-used river, EPA has installed solar powered continuous monitoring devices that 
upload via cell phone technology to agency computers.”250  Improved monitoring capacity is also 
making it possible to identify pollution that previously was unknown – it is making “previously 
invisible pollution visible.”251  Giles expresses the hope that advanced monitoring technologies 
“can help make [traditional monitoring challenges] obsolete.”252  In EPA’s view, in short, this 
dramatic recasting of monitoring capacity has the potential to revolutionize how EPA seeks to 
EPA, Office of Inspector General, EPA Needs to Track Whether Its Municipal Settlements for Combined Sewer 
Overflows Benefit Water Quality, Project No. 15-P-0280 (Sept. 16, 2015).  
246 See infra Part IVB.3-4.  EPA suggests that advancing fenceline monitoring will generate benefits that include 
working with the private sector to establish new monitoring methods transparently; enhancing certainty by 
establishing clear regulatory requirements that will be in place early enough to justify investments; reducing 
reporting burdens while collecting better data; encouraging facilities to show they are operating within permit limits 
and increasing certainty about which emissions are contributing to ambient problems; and encouraging state and 
local agency flexibility and experimentation.  EPA, FENCELINE PRIMER, supra note 243. 
247 EPA defines fenceline monitoring as “the measurement of air pollution at industrial facilities and site remediation 
boundaries,” and notes that the “techniques and instruments for fenceline monitoring can also be used inside of 
facility boundaries to monitor air pollutant levels near key process units.”  EPA, FENCELINE PRIMER, supra note 
243, at 1. 
248 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, DRAFT ROADMAP FOR NEXT-GENERATION AIR MONITORING 2 (2013), 
http://www.eunetair.it/cost/newsroom/03-US-EPA_Roadmap_NGAM-March2013.pdf.  
249 Giles, supra note 18, at 24. 
250 Id. 
251 Id.; see also EPA, FENCELINE PRIMER, supra note 243, at 2-7 (summarizing variations of fenceline monitoring 
and advantages and challenges, including market-based, technology, and financial issues).  Advancing fenceline 
monitoring is one facet of EPA’s larger “roadmap” for technology innovation.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS: AN EPA ROADMAP, 
http://www.epa.gov/envirfinance/innovation.html. 
252 Giles, supra note 18, at 24.  EPA suggests that streamlined and flexible industrywide fenceline monitoring 
requirements “could pave the way for a larger fenceline monitoring technology market.”  EPA, FENCELINE PRIMER, 
supra note 243, at 4. 
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promote compliance through the various legal mechanisms (such as rulemaking, permitting, and 
enforcement) available to it.253   
 
EPA’s hope is that such data will also facilitate regulated party efforts to identify and 
resolve issues.254  Further, it expects that the dramatic increase in the availability of monitoring 
technology, as purchase prices drop, will increase public use significantly and enhance 
communities’ understanding of pollution-related concerns.  As a result, advanced monitoring has 
the potential to impact significantly the roles regulated parties and civil society can play in 
improving compliance.  Increased accessibility of data, combined with the increasing mobility 
and accuracy of new technology and its capacity to provide real-time results, will, in Giles’s 
view, “encourage more direct industry and community engagement,” and may “reduce the need 
for government action.”255 
 
3.  Electronic Reporting 
 
Electronic reporting is a third key element of EPA’s Next Gen initiative.  EPA’s effort in 
this realm is geared towards having regulated parties report compliance-related information 
electronically, rather than on paper.256  Electronic reporting has the potential to be much faster 
and more accurate compared to paper reports that need to be entered manually onto a 
computer.257  Data problems have been an Achilles heel for effective compliance for decades, as 
a series of GAO and EPA OIG reports have detailed.258  As Giles has acknowledged: 
 
[M]uch of the information reported to EPA and states by facilities is still submitted on 
paper, and waits for a government employee to manually enter the data into computer 
systems.  Or, in a time of declining budgets, the paper sits in a corner unopened, until 
someone has time to examine the data and see if any violations appear likely. . . .   Errors 
can be introduced through manual data entry. . . . 259  
 
253 For more skeptical views, see, e.g., Nakayama, supra note 226. 
254 Giles, supra note 18, at 24.  Better and more real-time data may motivate regulated parties to reduce emissions 
because they “want to do the right thing;” want to limit impacts and potential liability; want to limit securities-
related issues; are concerned about a regulatory response; or are concerned about citizen reactions.  For example, 
Volkswagen’s stock value plunged by nearly 20 percent immediately following the Justice Department’s 
announcement that it had violated the Clean Air Act by installing “defeat devices” on its diesel models between 
2009 and 2015.  Thad Moore, Anthony Faiola & Sari Horowitz, Fallout Comes Fast for Volkswagen, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 22, 2015.  As we discuss in our second article on Dynamic Governance, supra note 7, advanced monitoring 
also has the potential to transform state-federal relations.  It also can equip Congress and the Executive, and the 
courts in some cases, with the capacity to exercise their powers to oversee EPA’s administration of regulatory 
programs in a more informed way.   
255 Giles, supra note 18, at 24. 
256 EPA’s ambitions for electronic reporting extend beyond simply transferring reporting from a paper to an 
electronic medium.  This facet of EPA’s Next Generation initiative is closely linked to its larger E-Enterprise for the 
Environment initiative, which is a joint EPA-state effort.  See E-ENTERPRISE LEADERSHIP COUNCIL, E-ENTERPRISE 
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT CONCEPTUAL BLUEPRINT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.exchangenetwork.net/ee/EEnterprise_Conceptual_Blueprint_013114_Executive_Summary.pdf. 
257 Giles, supra note 18, at 25. 
258 See Markell, Slack, supra note 14, at 63.  
259 Giles, supra note 18, at 25. 
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Giles notes that “E-reporting is a solution that saves time and money while improving results.”260  
She notes that it will also create greater transparency by dramatically improving accessibility of 
compliance information.261 
  
4.  Increased Transparency 
 
EPA identifies “increased transparency” as the fourth key feature of its Next Gen 
approach.  Giles suggests that “[u]sing transparency as a way to improve performance is one of 
the most important things we have learned about strategies to improve compliance. . . [and, 
further, that] EPA’s efforts to make our data more available are only starting to scratch the 
surface of the ways transparency can improve results.”262  She notes that information must be 
“important and correct” for transparency to work; hence, transparency goes hand in hand with 
the related Next Gen features of advanced monitoring and electronic reporting.263  Giles 
highlights several ways in which improved transparency could produce improved compliance 
and better environmental results – including serving as a “reminder” to regulated parties of 
problems and of their performance relative to the competition; and also as a reminder to 
government officials and the public of the absolute and relative performance of different 
members of the regulated community.264 
 
5.  Innovative Enforcement Strategies 
 
“Innovative enforcement strategies” is the fifth and final Next Gen element.  Giles 
identifies an array of innovative approaches that will enhance compliance, many of which are 
byproducts of the first four Next Gen elements.  She suggests, for example, that advanced 
monitoring will help EPA better identify violators and target enforcement.265  Electronic 
reporting will also save money for both regulated parties and government.266  Further, Giles 
suggests that by “shifting . . . into the electronic age,” states can improve their performance, gain 
additional flexibility in the state-federal relationship, and better serve as laboratories of 
experimentation.267  She also notes that third-party verification of compliance efforts and status 
will improve compliance and conserve government resources.268  In addition, Giles notes that 
260 Id. 
261 Id.  We discuss each element, including the concerns various stakeholders have raised about them, in Part V 
below and in Part II of our exploration of Dynamic Governance, supra note 7. 
262 Giles, supra note 18, at 25. 
263 Id. at 26. 
264 Id.  
265 Id. 
266 Id. 
267 Id.  For a review of state innovations in the compliance promotion arena, including some innovations such as 
third-party verification touted by Giles, see David L. Markell, States as Innovators: It’s Time for a New Look to our 
“Laboratories of Democracy” in the Effort to Improve our Approach to Environmental Regulation, 58 ALB. L. REV. 
347 (1994). 
268 Sounding another skeptical note, one commentator has suggested that third-party verification is “so last 
generation” and, while it may have been innovative in the 1970s, it is no longer so.  Seth Jaffe, Coming Soon to a 
Settlement Near You: Next Generation Compliance, LAW & THE ENV’T, Jan. 26, 2015, 
http://www.lawandenvironment.com/2015/01/26/coming-soon-to-a-settlement-near-you-next-generation-
compliance/.  For reviews of third-party verification regimes and their design, see, e.g., McAllister, supra note 182, 
at 22-23 (discussing need for auditor independence and competence). 
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“better, more accurate information” will enable EPA and others to learn more about the 
effectiveness of different compliance promotion strategies – it will “encourage evidence-based 
experimentation to find out which strategies work to improve compliance and which do not.”269   
There is still much to be learned about the effectiveness of different enforcement strategies in 
different contexts, and an information-rich environment will help shed light on questions that 
scholars and others have been unable to answer because of historical gaps in the available 
data.270  Giles concludes that, while “[v]igorous enforcement . . . will always be the backbone of 
environmental protection, [a]s we continue to learn about ways to strengthen compliance, and 
take advantage of advances in technology, Next Gen can transform our protection work . . . .”271 
 
V.  The Insights Provided by Focusing on Actors, Mechanisms, and Tools 
 
 As Part III above indicates, EPA faces a series of challenges in regulatory enforcement as 
a result of the dynamic regulatory environment in which it operates.  The agency has developed a 
“new paradigm,” its Next Gen initiative, to improve governance and outcomes in the face of 
those challenges, as described in Part IV.  As EPA conceptualizes this new governance 
paradigm, it has five key elements:  (1) rules with compliance built in; (2) advanced monitoring; 
(3) electronic monitoring; (4) increased transparency; and (5) innovative enforcement strategies.   
 
Our claim in this article is not that these are inappropriate elements to consider in making 
governance decisions.  Instead, we argue that our conceptual framework – under which policy 
designers would consider the full range of actors, mechanisms, and tools available to advance 
policy in a particular arena – helps to ensure that policy designers, such as the enterprising EPA 
officials who have launched Next Gen, consider and integrate the full range of variables that 
have the potential to contribute to effective governance in pursuing new paradigms to address 
dynamic circumstances.272  In this part we illustrate the value of our framework by assessing how 
analysis of the role of one set of actors, citizen actors, may shape redesign of regulatory 
enforcement structures and initiatives in response to dynamic circumstances.273 
269 Giles, supra note 18, at 26. 
270 See, e.g., Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack, The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: 
A Review of the Empirical Evidence, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y  3 (2011); RECHTSCHAFFEN & MARKELL, supra 
note 128, at __. 
271 Giles, supra note 18, at 26. 
272 We have not seen the challenges of the administrative state contextualized in precisely this way and welcome 
challenges to this conceptualization.  Others have framed the key features of regulatory governance differently.  See, 
e.g., Mamiko Yokoi-Arai, The Regulatory Efficiency of a Single Regulator in Financial Services: Analysis of the UK 
and Japan, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 23, 27 (2006) (defining public sector governance as “the traditions and 
institutions that determine how authority is exercised in a particular country,” including “(1) the process by which 
governments are selected, held accountable, monitored, and replaced; (2) the capacity of government to manage 
resources efficiently and to formulate, implement, and enforce sound policies and regulations; and (3) the respect of 
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them”); Richard B. 
Stewart, Remedying Disregard in Global Regulatory Governance: Accountability, Participation, and 
Responsiveness, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 211, 212 (2014) (identifying “the institutional mechanisms and structures of 
global regulatory decision making, and presenting “a new taxonomy of governance mechanisms, distinguishing 
three basic types – decision rules, accountability mechanisms, and other regard-promoting measures”); Lesley K. 
McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 291, 299 (2014) (identifying three 
“aspects” of regulation – rule creation, rule implementation, and rule enforcement). 
273 We address the other key actors, key mechanisms, and key tools in our accompanying article, Dynamic 
Governance, Part II, supra note 7.     
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 A.  Capacity and Coordination in Integrating Civil Society Roles 
 
We suggest that the role that a policy regime should create for citizens depends on at least 
two key issues, the absolute and relative capacities of citizens, government officials, and 
regulated parties to perform functions that advance regulatory goals, and the degree to which 
actions by different actors (in this context especially government and citizens) can be 
coordinated.274  Citizens’ capacity implicates the extent to which civil society has the 
wherewithal (including financial, technical, level of commitment, and ability to overcome 
collective action problems) to undertake particular tasks.  Coordination is a critical feature of 
enhanced citizen involvement because members of civil society may be motivated by private 
interests that diverge from the “public interest,” however that is defined, which suggests the need 
to consider various forms of gatekeeping and other constraints on citizen action. 275  Further, 
even if civil society’s interests are aligned perfectly with the “public interest” (which is 
unlikely), the introduction of a multiplicity of “civil society actors” creates significant 
coordination challenges.276   
 
B.  Civil Society’s Entry Points in Environmental Enforcement and Compliance 
 
This section considers the implications of these capacity and coordination questions in 
the context of four types of civil society engagement.  The discussion illustrates how our 
framework can help identify and illuminate policy choices that may contribute to effective 
regulatory programs, including the enforcement and compliance structures that EPA’s Next Gen 
initiative is designed to overhaul.277   
 
 First, federal laws provide a multitude of entry points for civil society into environmental 
actions undertaken by the government.  This is obviously the case in rulemaking, which features 
opportunities to participate before a regulation is proposed (including petitioning an agency to 
274 We invite others to add to these variables, and recognize that they include treatment of issues such as procedural 
justice.  
275 See, e.g., Engstrom, supra note 15, at 634-37 (discussing coordination issues arising from private enforcement 
efforts, such as “piggybacking” on public enforcement and disrupting relationships between regulators and their 
targets); see also Michael Greve, Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits Become 
an Entitlement Program, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS, 105-28 (Michael S. 
Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds., 1992). 
276 The risks include over-deterrence and inconsistent treatment of similarly situated parties.  See, e.g., Atlantic 
States Legal Found., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 933 F.2d 124, 127-28 (2d Cir. 1991) (stating that a citizen suit 
may not “supplant state enforcement,” and that once the government has reached a settlement the citizen suit cannot 
continue merely because the citizens have different views about appropriate relief).  Cf. Sierra Club, Lone Star 
Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co. Inc., 73 F.3d 546, 569 n.37 (5th Cir. 1996) (concluding that “courts should exercise 
restraint” in addressing citizen suit alleging a discharge in violation of the CWA for which EPA has not adopted a 
permit or limitation due to lack of resources or low prioritization); Wisconsin’s Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Wisconsin 
Power & Light Co., 395 F. Supp. 313, 319 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (discussing legislators’ fears that allowing citizen suits 
against the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to require enforcement action “might have the effect of 
distorting the agency’s enforcement priorities”). 
277 Other types of engagement are also available.  For example, citizens have played a role in encouraging 
companies to reduce emissions and other releases subject to reporting under the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) 
program.  See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh & David Markell, Informational Regulation, the Environment, and the 
Public (forthcoming 2016); Vandenbergh, supra note 82, at 129. 
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create a rule), submit comments during the rulemaking process, and challenge in court a rule 
when it is finalized.278  In permitting, citizens have an opportunity to comment on a draft 
permit;279 as in the rulemaking setting, citizens may also have an opportunity to participate 
before that point and to challenge a final permit.280  In some cases, citizens may have an 
opportunity to participate in agency-initiated enforcement proceedings as well, to provide 
comments before a settlement is finalized, and to challenge a proposed settlement.281  In addition 
to these venues, EPA has established processes to engage citizens, including obtaining citizen 
input more generally.282   
 
Dramatic improvements in data technologies (greater amounts of collected data and more 
accurate, timely, and accessible data) and communication technologies have significant potential 
to increase civil society’s capacity to contribute through these entry points.  As a result, policy 
design efforts should consider how to help bolster citizen capacity to take advantage of these 
technological and other advances, as well as to structure these entry points to enable and 
encourage citizen participation. 283  However, policy design should also consider risks that such 
advances may create.  For example, apparent increases in citizen capacity may amount to less 
than meets the eye if the data are problematic because of concerns about their accuracy or the 
absence of important contextual information.284  Indeed, such advances may pose coordination 
challenges if they overload the system and divert agency officials from higher priorities.  Risks 
that newly available information may confuse or mislead citizens and thereby prompt citizen 
278 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b)-(c), (e) (2012); id. §§ 702, 704; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (discussing the 
right of citizens to petition an agency to develop a rule and then to challenge in court an agency’s decision not to 
proceed). 
279 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. §§ 71.11(a)(5), 124.10-124.12 
280 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 124.19; 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704 (2012). 
281  See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pt. 22; John C. Cruden & Bruce S. Gelber, Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement: 
Process, Actors, and Trends, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 10 (2004).  
282 EPA has developed citizen involvement plans, community participation plans, and other strategies to provide 
information to citizens, solicit citizen input, and otherwise enhance citizens’ capacity to weigh in on activities that 
may implicate environmental or health concerns.  EPA’s Environmental Justice initiative pays particular attention to 
engaging citizens.  See generally EPA FOR CITIZEN ACTION, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/citizen.htm.  Federal 
advisory committees are another example.  See FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES AT EPA, 
http://www2.epa.gov/faca (last visited July 29, 2015).  One of the co-authors served on such an EPA committee for 
several years.   
283 The procedural justice literature offers insights into the value of citizen participation and how to structure it to 
advance procedural justice.  See, e.g., David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design 
Government Citizen Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizen’s Roles in Environmental Compliance and 
Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 24 (2008) (discussing reasons that citizens value procedures); David L. Markell, 
et al., What Has Love Got to Do with It?: Sentimental Attachments and Legal Decision-Making, 57 VILL. L. REV. 
209, 212-13 (2012) (discussing features of procedural justice, particularly the positive effects when judges inform 
the public of their rights and give them an opportunity to speak); see also Tom R. Tyler & David L. Markell, The 
Public Regulation of Land Use Decisions: Criteria for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUDIES 538, 544 (2010) (suggesting that procedural injustices may be alleviated where governments consider 
public opinion).  
284 The TRI program, which made more data about facility pollution releases public available than ever before, has 
been subject to such criticisms.  See, e.g., Stephen M. Johnson, Competition: The Next Generation of Environmental 
Regulation?, 18 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 17 (2009) (describing criticism of TRI data as “incomplete, 
inaccurate, or confusing”); Abdallah Simaika, The Value of Information: Alternatives to Liability in Influencing 
Corporate Behavior Overseas, 38 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 321, 359 (2005) (describing criticism of TRI program 
“for providing mounds of raw, unrefined data with little instruction on its effective use”). 
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engagement that diverts agency officials from higher priority concerns or otherwise interferes 
with the effective and efficient functioning of the administrative state highlights the importance 
of considering possible unintended consequences of initiatives intended to build capacity.285 
Existing agency or judicial arbiters whose job it is to manage a proceeding and to make informed 
judgments, such as an administrative law judge (ALJ) in an enforcement proceeding,286 may help 
to mitigate unintended consequences.  For other citizen entry points, modifications to agency 
procedures may be warranted, as agencies have begun to explore in contexts such as 
management of public comment on proposed regulations in response to increased capacity for 
mass commenting.287  The key point in terms of our framework is that as citizen access to 
information changes, it will be important for EPA to consider issues relating to capacity and 
coordination in structuring citizens’ roles at each of these entry points into the regulatory 
process. 
 
A second form of civil society engagement involves citizen interactions with regulated 
parties.  For example, citizens concerned about operations at a nearby plant may contact plant 
officials to raise concerns and acquire information.  “Good neighbor agreements” are a vehicle 
sometimes used to create more or less formal arrangements between neighbors and regulated 
parties.288  In some cases, these interactions may be required by legislation, as under the Clean 
Air Act in connection with emergency preparedness.289  In others, EPA may embed such an 
arrangement in a permit or in settlement of an enforcement case.290  Alternatively, citizens have 
285 See Engstrom, supra note 15, at 634-37 (discussing the concern that inexperienced, or single-issue private 
enforcers can “generate bad precedent,” which then restricts government regulators and hampers enforcement efforts 
that are in the public interest).  
286 KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 8.11, at 564 (1958) (discussing methods for controlling 
intervention in administrative proceedings). The procedures for intervention vary by agency.  Agencies that allow 
limited public participation generally give ALJs substantial discretion to determine its nature and extent.  See, e.g., 
14 C.F.R. § 13.206(b) (2012) (allowing ALJs for the Federal Aviation Administration to “determine the extent to 
which an intervenor may participate in the proceedings”); 16 C.F.R. § 3.14(a) (2012) (allowing Federal Trade 
Commission ALJs or the Commission to issue an order permitting intervention “to such extent and upon such terms 
as are provided by law or as otherwise may be deemed proper”).  See generally ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD 
E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 490-95 (2010). 
287 See, e.g., Wendy A. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information Capture, 59 DUKE L.J. 1321, 
1331, 1332 (2010) (describing how “filter failure” has allowed affected interests to submit “voluminous filings” and 
put agencies “at the mercy of an unlimited flood of information through various pluralistic processes,” including 
notice and comment rulemaking); Cynthia R. Farina, & Mary J., Newhart, Rulemaking 2.0: Understanding and 
Getting Better Public Participation, CORNELL E-RULEMAKING INITIATIVE PUBLICATIONS, Paper 15 (2013), 
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/ceri/15.  
288 Thalia González & Giovanni Saarman, Regulating Pollutants, Negative Externalities, and Good Neighbor 
Agreements: Who Bears the Burden of Protecting Communities?, 41 ECOLOGY L.Q. 37, 39 (2014); see also Sanford 
Lewis & Diane Henkels, Good Neighbor Agreements: A Tool for Environmental and Social Justice, 23 SOC. JUST. 4, 
138-39 (1996); David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design Government Citizen 
Participation Processes: A Case Study of Citizens' Roles in Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 1, 11 n.55 (2008). 
289 42 U.S.C. § 7412(r) (2012) (requiring certain facilities to publish Risk Management Plans and make them 
available to the public).   
290 See United States v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., Civ. Action No. 3:10-cv-00563-bbc, 100 (W.D. Wis. 2010) 
(requiring defendant to conduct monthly meetings with a local non-profit organization to discuss citizen concerns, 
and provide them with a report on the progress on the Consent Decree and updated data on the refinery).  EPA has 
published a list of the ten enforcement settlements that reflect Next Gen features.  At least three of those 
incorporated good neighbor agreements.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION  AGENCY, NEXT GENERATION ENFORCEMENT 
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sometimes worked relatively independently of agencies to negotiate such agreements.291  These 
agreements may require improved access to information, regulated party commitments to 
reductions in pollution and development of accident response plans, and investment in 
community services.292  Proponents of good neighbor agreements have suggested that they offer 
potential for innovation because the strategy is experimental; they lead to increased citizen 
influence over activities within community borders; and they are likely to yield predictable 
benefits when embodied in a binding agreement.293   
 
New, better, and more timely information about pollutant releases and risks has the 
potential to transform these relationships, with significant implications for the shape of 
governance more generally.  EPA Assistant Administrator Giles hopes that emergence of such 
significantly enhanced regulated party/community relationships (“interactions on steroids”) will 
reduce the need for government engagement as citizens and regulated party capacity and 
coordination improves.294  But, again, policy design will need to be mindful of the real-world as 
well as theoretical consequences of such advances in information availability.  In the real world, 
improved capacity for such interactions between regulated entities and citizen groups may not 
provide the anticipated enhancements to regulatory enforcement.  Authors of a recent case study 
of a good neighbor agreement express skepticism about the viability of “shifting the burden” of 
overseeing regulated parties from government officials to communities.295  Capacity concerns 
were a significant reason for this skepticism.296  The authors suggest that, even in relatively 
affluent communities, the public generally lacks the resources and technical expertise needed to 
accomplish the necessary comprehensive monitoring.297  Deputization of civil society is likely to 
pose coordination issues as well and process designers would be well served to consider how to 
address them.298   
SETTLEMENT HIGHLIGHTS, http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-01/documents/nextgen-
enfsettlementhighlights.pdf (Murphy Oil, BP Whiting, and Tyson Foods). 
291 See Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environmental Justice: Turning Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through 
Collaborative Bargaining, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 170–71 (2002) (stating that good neighbor agreements are “a 
viable tool for communities to bargain with industry for positive reforms, policies, and financial investment that 
protect community health and welfare while also responding to industry’s needs”). 
292 González & Saarman, supra note 287, at 40; Lewis & Henkels, supra note 287, at 138-45. 
293 Lewis & Henkels, supra note 287, at 147-48. 
294 See Giles, supra note 18, at 24.  
295 González & Saarman, supra note 287, at 41 (concluding that “reliance on Good Neighbor  . . . is misguided and 
detracts from the critical need for an environmental regulatory regime to take the responsibility off of communities 
and to adequately address the impacts of industrial pollution”). 
296 The authors argue that good neighbor agreements can present hurdles for community activists, including bringing 
corporate management to the negotiating table, ensuring that the community can present a unified set of interests, 
and lengthy negotiations.  These problems are amplified in the politically disenfranchised and historically 
marginalized communities where good neighbor agreements are most often considered as an alternative for 
addressing environmental harms.  Id. at 62.  The authors note that “[t]he American Lung Association describes the 
capacity for communities to complete studies of pollution exposure as ‘quite limited.’”  Id. at 44. 
297 González & Saarman, supra note 287, at 45.  In its Environmental Justice materials, EPA also has highlighted 
capacity concerns in its assessment of community empowerment.  U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, PLAN EJ 
2014, SUPPORTING COMMUNITY-BASED ACTION PROGRAMS 1 (2014), 
http://www3.epa.gov/environmentaljustice/plan-ej/community-action.html (noting that “we realize that far too many 
communities . . . lack the capacity to affect environmental conditions”).  EPA’s environmental justice initiative 
includes efforts to build such capacity.  Id. 
298 Promoting coordination among public and private actors is likely to be relatively easy when a good neighbor-type 
arrangement is created through an agency settlement that is enforceable by the government.  See United States v. 
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 In short, new technologies and other advances are dramatically enhancing the possibility 
of improved communications and relationships between regulated parties and the communities in 
which they operate.  As these changes develop, questions of civil society capacity and the 
mechanics of coordination are likely to be important parts of program design initiatives intended 
to empower citizens and, to a greater or lesser degree, privatize traditional government functions 
by empowering civil society through interactions between regulated entities and citizen 
representatives.     
 
A third type of citizen engagement involves equipping and empowering citizens to serve 
as fire alarms.299  Because of their numbers, proximity to regulated facilities, and interest in 
protecting their families’ health or access to clean natural resources, citizens may learn about 
problems before the government does, and sometimes before even the facility itself uncovers 
them.  The literature refers to citizens providing such information to the government as a “fire 
alarm” function.300  Just as a citizen pulls a fire alarm to alert the fire department of the need for 
help, a citizen provides information to the government to notify the government of the need for 
attention.301   
 
In the context of this entry point, as for the two discussed above, the significant increase 
in publicly available information, including in some cases information that citizens themselves 
generate due to access to cheaper and more accurate monitoring technologies,302 will inevitably 
dramatically increase citizens’ capacity and willingness to serve as “fire alarms.”  Close attention 
to citizens’ capacity, and to coordination with government enforcement efforts, will be critical as 
their fire alarms role expands.  For example, false alarms divert scarce resources that otherwise 
would be devoted to higher priority activities.303  Considerable education to help citizens 
Murphy Oil USA, Inc., Civ. Action No. 3:10-cv-00563-bbc, 100 (W.D. Wis. 2010) (settlement requiring Murphy 
Oil to install an ambient monitoring system so that the citizens had access to air pollution data in their 
neighborhood; make publicly available on its website meteorological and ambient monitoring data; hold monthly 
meetings with the public to discuss concerns and ensure transparency; and conduct community enhancement 
projects such as mitigating excess noise levels, fence construction, and reporting at public meetings on efforts to 
suppress dust caused by activities/wind on refinery property).  
299 Hammond & Markell, supra note 11, at 356, 357 (noting that “[t]he classic account of fire alarms provides that 
they are a means of converting ‘the oversight job of a politician from active monitor to reactive servant of affected 
constituencies,’” and that “[a]lthough the origins of the fire-alarm theory lie in a traditional principal agent 
conceptualization of administrative law — the theory originally focused on congressional oversight — fire alarms 
can provide notification to many different actors”) (citing McNollgast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 434 (1989)).  
300 See ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 
761 (2d ed. 2014) (“Fire alarms leverage the public’s interest in compliance and reduce [government] enforcement 
costs, but are only effective if the public is likely to be aware of violations and has the incentive to report them.”); 
McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 250 (1987); 
Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire 
Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).   
301 EPA has established a web page, Reporting Environmental Violations, http://www2.epa.gov/enforcement/report-
environmental-violations, which covers both emergencies and whistleblower protection. 
302 See Snyder, et al., supra note 51 (discussing the status of air pollution sensor technologies and their implications 
for citizen science). 
303 See Kal Raustiala, Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 389, 410 
(2004) (suggesting that one of the shortcomings of using citizens as “fire alarms” is that the participation is 
inherently decentralized, and because it is driven by “disconnected individual choices,” enforcement can be 
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understand the information they generate or can access, so that they can make informed 
judgments about when government intervention is needed, will be essential to optimize citizens’ 
service as fire alarms.304  The government may find it worthwhile to experiment with possible 
fire alarm mechanism features (e.g., who may pull an alarm, how it is pulled, the type of 
response it triggers) as it tries to calibrate use of those mechanisms in a world in which citizens 
have real-time access to an enormous volume of information.305 
 
A fourth type of citizen engagement involves citizens operating as direct actors through 
the legal process, with citizen suits serving as the most prominent example of this direct citizen 
engagement. 306  Almost all of the major environmental laws authorize citizens to bring suit in 
federal district court against violators under some circumstances.307  Congress empowered 
citizens to bring their own lawsuits against violators to address its concern that government 
resources were too limited to enable it to bring suit in all of the cases in which enforcement 
action is appropriate and to provide a safety net in the event of agency capture.308  It opened the 
courthouse doors to citizens so that they could pursue violators and supply deterrence beyond 
that stemming from government enforcement activities.309  Further, Congress authorized the 
unfocused, reactive, and not in the collective best interest of the community). 
304 EPA, FY 2014-2018, supra note 157, at 73 (noting that “sharing of critical, up-to-date information (such as skills 
and services, best practices and success stories, useful contacts, relevant grants and technical assistance, data, and 
multimedia strategies)” will be needed to encourage citizen contributions to environmental research that 
complements EPA research) 
305 One of the authors has previously provided in-depth reviews of two different citizen fire alarm mechanisms in the 
environmental enforcement arena, one involving citizens’ capacity to petition EPA to withdraw a state’s 
authorization to administer a regulatory program based on deficient state performance, and the other involving 
international review of ineffectual enforcement performance.  See Hammond & Markell, supra note 11, at 356 
(discussing petition to withdraw state permitting authorization as a type of fire alarm); David Markell, The Role of 
Spotlighting Procedures in Promoting Citizen Participation, Transparency, and Accountability, 45 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 425 (2010).  
306 For general treatment of citizen suits, see, e.g., SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATIONS 
AND PRIVATE LAW SUITS IN THE UNITED STATES (Princeton Univ. Press 2010).  For symposium treatment of citizen 
suits under the environmental laws specifically, see Symposium, supra note 17.  Common law suits such as private 
nuisance actions are another enforcement mechanism sometimes available to citizens, either independent of or in 
tandem with statutory actions.  See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (discussing CWA 
preemption of state common law nuisance actions involving water pollution); American Elec. Power Co. v. 
Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (discussing Clean Air Act displacement of federal common law nuisance actions 
to abate greenhouse gas emissions).   
307 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (CWA) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (RCRA) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2012) (CAA); 
42 U.S.C. § 9659 (2012) (CERCLA); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2012) (Endangered Species Act).  For a recent 
review, see Edward Lloyd, Citizen Suits and Defenses against Them, SW014 ALI-CLE 285 (Feb. 2015) (on file with 
authors).  EPA has limited control over some of the parameters for citizen suits established by the statutes 
themselves, such as statutory standing requirements.  But it has the ability to influence the availability of citizen 
suits through its own actions, such as taking enforcement action that operates to preclude a citizen suit.  See, e.g., 
Karl S. Coplan, Citizen Enforcement, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL 
DECISIONMAKING  (Leroy C. Paddock, David L. Markell & Nicholas Bryner eds., forthcoming 2016) (on file with 
authors).  
308 Karl S. Coplan, Citizen Litigants Citizen Regulators: Four Cases Where Citizen Suits Drove Development of 
Clean Water Law, 25 COLO. NAT. RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 61, 65 (2014) (elaborating on the 
development of environmental citizen suits, and on Congress’ intentions when incorporating this enforcement 
mechanism into the Clean Air Act). 
309 See, e.g., Megha Shah, Grassroots Enforcement of EISA: The Need for A Citizen Suit Provision in the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 488, 497 (2009) (“[E]ven with diligent government 
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award of attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs to provide incentives for citizens to bring 
cases.310  
 
At the same time, for various reasons, including concerns about coordination, Congress 
preserved for the government primary enforcement authority, confining citizens to a 
supplemental or subordinate role.311  It required citizens to provide advance notice to the 
government and alleged violators before filing suit to enable the government to preempt the 
citizens’ action.312  Similarly, in some cases courts have held that a later-filed government action 
operates to render a citizen suit moot because the government action adequately addresses the 
alleged violations.313  Thus, Congress established a gatekeeping regime that enables the 
government to monitor and, in some cases, displace, citizen suits.314 
 
The significant increase in accessible information that is a primary goal and feature of the 
Next Gen initiative will make it easier to launch citizen suits.315  Although Congress likely did 
not anticipate this dramatic change in capacity, it will increase the importance of coordinating 
government and private enforcement, such as through EPA’s exercise of its gatekeeping 
authority.  EPA will need to be alert to a issues that include over-deterrence, inconsistent 
treatment of similarly situated regulated parties, the use of theories and evidence in ways that 
might have unintended consequences for EPA’s policy objectives, and citizens’ exercise of their 
“private attorney general” authority to pursue their own private rather than public interests.316    
 
C. Dynamism, Environmental Enforcement, and Regulatory Redesign of  Civil Society’s 
Roles 
 
The revolution in data availability that is central to Next Generation Compliance will 
significantly affect citizens’ roles in each of the four contexts discussed above.317  More data 
enforcement, the knowledge that concerned citizens have the ability to enforce compliance serves as a deterrent for 
those entities contemplating violating the law.  Thus, citizen suits encourage compliance with environmental statutes 
by both serving as an enforcement mechanism for past violations of the statute and as a deterrent against future 
violations.”); see also Sarah L. Stafford, Private Policing of Environmental Performance: Does It Further Public 
Goals?, 39 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 73, 78 (2012) (noting that citizen suits can supplement limited government 
enforcement resources, “thereby increasing the level of deterrence associated with environmental violations”). 
310 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2012). 
311 Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 61 (1987) (characterizing intended citizens’ roles as 
“interstitial,” not “potentially intrusive”).  A Senate Report stated that “[t]he Committee intends the great volume of 
enforcement actions [to] be brought by the State.” Id. at 60 (citing S. REP. NO. 92–414, at 64 (1971), reprinted in 2A 
Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, at 1482 (1973)). 
312 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 7604(b) (2012) 
313 Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 933 F.2d 124, 128 (2nd Cir. 1991).   
314 For detailed consideration of agency gatekeeping of citizen suits, see Engstrom, supra note 15 (suggesting the 
importance of contextual features in design of such regimes).  
315 See Markell & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 74-75.  This is not to downplay the evidentiary and other issues 
citizens are likely to face in seeking to rely on new types of data.  See, e.g., Zacaroli, supra note 66 (discussing the 
pros and cons for a company facing a citizen suit).  Access to better information also may increase the viability of 
common law actions, particularly when monitoring data suggest material harm to individuals or the ambient 
environment. 
316 Markell & Glicksman, supra note 19, at 73-74.  
317 See Memo from Cynthia Giles, EPA Assistant Administrator, to EPA Regional Counsels, Use of Next Generation 
Tools in Civil Enforcement Settlements 3 (Jan. 7, 2015), http://www2.epa.gov/sites/production/ 
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generated by regulated parties, and more data collected by citizens, will expand citizens’ 
capacity to participate in EPA decision-making processes, including rulemakings, permit 
proceedings, and enforcement actions.  It also will affect citizens’ capacity to work directly with 
regulated parties through “good neighbor” and other arrangements; expand citizens’ role as fire 
alarms alerting government to perceived concerns; and provide a basis for increased citizen suit 
activity.   
 
Regardless of one’s views of the normative implications of these significant changes in 
citizens’ roles, process designers need to account for these consequences.  In the context of the 
Next Gen initiative, it will be important for EPA to consider the likely implications of this rollout 
of dramatically increased data and improved communications technology for the roles that 
citizens may play.  We have identified some of these implications to illustrate the type of 
analysis we regard as critical to process design that carefully considers both possible benefits and 
unintended consequences of such transformations in capacity, and of other aspects of a dynamic 
regulatory environment.  Consideration of the impact of change on the desired role of citizen 
actors is particularly important when a goal of program redesign is to expand non-governmental 
organizations’ roles, as is the case for EPA’s ongoing initiative.  In Dynamic Governance, Part 
II, we extend our conceptual framework to consider other key actors, and important mechanisms 
and tools. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
One of the many factors that complicates efforts to govern effectively is the dynamic 
character of many policy challenges and the opportunities to address them.  This article 
demonstrates the dynamic character of a wide array of policy arenas, and suggests several 
sources of or reasons for such dynamism.  Beyond arguing that those involved in policy design 
and implementation should account for this reality, the article offers a conceptual framework for 
doing so, notably that policy design needs to account for the full array of actors that have the 
potential to affect regulatory implementation, the range of mechanisms available to promote 
regulatory goals, and the tools available to the actors with the authority and capacity to use these 
mechanisms.     
                                             
Our conceptual framework has value independently, but it also provides insights when 
viewed through a different lens that the rich literature on adaptive management offers for 
facilitating adaptability as circumstances change.  For example, as we describe in Part IIE above, 
adaptive management is a decisionmaking methodology crafted specifically to deal with change.  
It is an iterative, structured approach that includes, among other steps, problem identification, 
establishment of management goals, selection and implementation of management actions, 
monitoring and evaluation of those actions, and cycling back to the first step for refinement in 
light of lessons learned.318  Our framework suggests that, at each step, policymakers’ 
files/2015-01/documents/memo-nextgen-useinenfsettlements.pdf.  Giles alluded to a hoped-for expansion of the first 
type of interaction in her 2015 memo.  Id. (“Some [Next Gen] tools [will] allow individuals and communities that 
are impacted by a facility’s environmental noncompliance to have real-time access to environmental information 
stemming from a settlement.”). 
318 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.  For discussion of the value of ex post, “back-end” 
decisionmaking procedures for rulemaking and adjudication, see Robert L. Glicksman & Sidney A. Shapiro, 
Improving Regulation Through Incremental Adjustment, 52 KAN L. REV. 1179 (2004); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert 
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consideration of the full range of possible actors and their roles, of possible legal and other 
mechanisms, and of tools is likely to enhance their ability to craft regulatory programs that allow 
each step to proceed in an optimal way, while minimizing regulatory and practical barriers to 
doing so.  Other decisionmaking methodologies for responding to change are likely to present a 
different array of choices in light of the actors, mechanisms, and tools involved in their design 
and implementation. 
 
We have used the specific context of regulatory enforcement to demonstrate the value of 
our conceptual framework because we are convinced that it offers a useful and revealing lens for 
policy design in a dynamic context.  The opportunity to apply our framework in this context 
stems from EPA’s determination that the dynamic circumstances it confronts require radical 
reform of its enforcement and compliance infrastructure, and its decision to establish a 
transformative enforcement and compliance “paradigm” in response to the shifting landscape it 
faces.  The discussion above reviews the challenges facing EPA that have persuaded it of the 
need for a new approach, identifies the elements of the transformative effort on which EPA has 
embarked, and provides examples of the kinds of sophisticated regulatory design choices that our 
framework may illuminate. 
 
We respectfully suggest that our conceptual framework may provide a helpful lens for 
considering regulatory design, including redesign of regulatory enforcement.  The five elements 
that EPA has described as the centerpiece of Next Generation Compliance are a mix of what we 
suggest should be termed “mechanisms” and “tools,” and we think it is important to consider 
them distinctly at a conceptual level.  Two of EPA’s five elements – “rules with compliance built 
in” and “innovative enforcement”319 – refer to legal mechanisms available to EPA in 
implementing policy.  In contrast, the other three – advanced monitoring, electronic reporting, 
and increased transparency – are tools to advance Next Generation Compliance that typically are 
put into use through a legal mechanism, including rulemaking, permitting, or enforcement.  
EPA’s own materials acknowledge as much.320  This lack of conceptual clarity has the potential 
to cause an agency such as EPA to miss opportunities to advance its goals more effectively 
through a different mix of actors, mechanisms, and tools.  Our discussion of the role of citizen 
actors in Part V illustrates why we believe that use of our framework is likely to aid in surfacing 
and addressing critical issues for today’s complicated multi-level, multi-governance realities. 
 
In a second article that serves as a companion piece to this one, we continue our 
exploration of the value of our three-part policy design framework, both generally and by 
applying it to EPA’s new enforcement venture.  In that article, we elaborate on the introductory 
discussion here on why our framework focuses attention on what we believe to be critical policy 
design questions:  who are the key actors; what legal and other mechanisms might each actor use 
to advance a desired policy objective; and what tools (such as advanced monitoring in the EPA 
context) might be helpful in advancing that objective.321  The application of the framework to 
L. Glicksman, The APA and the Back-End of Regulation: Procedures for Informal Adjudication, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 
1159 (2004). 
319 See supra Part IVB.1, 5. 
320 See, e.g., Giles, supra note 1, at 26 (citing use of rulemaking and /or enforcement to include advanced monitoring 
and other tools). 
321 The answers to each of those questions will vary depending on the context.  See, e.g., Greg Mitchell, Good 
Scholarly Intentions Do Not Guarantee Good Policy, 95 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 109, 111 (2010) (arguing, in the 
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EPA’s Next Generation Compliance Initiative illustrates how the three components of the 
framework relate to one another, and that both the mechanisms and tools available to implement 
a regulatory program interact with a variety of actors, both inside and outside government.  This 
case study also demonstrates that, by focusing policymakers’ attention on the challenges 
presented by a dynamic regulatory environment in a structured manner, our framework may help 
to spot significant issues that otherwise are not likely to receive sufficient attention as part of 
regulatory reform efforts, and thereby avoid missing important opportunities for successful 
reform.  
 
 
 
context of anti-discrimination policy, that scholars must avoid oversimplifying complex problems because they may 
have context-dependent solutions).  Our three dimensions are intended to be inclusive:  actors can and often do work 
together; an agency may use more than one mechanism to advance a policy objective; and a mechanism may make 
use of more than one tool. 
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